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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is designed to serve as a First Amendment "com-
pass," explaining the Speech Clause while offering a systematic
method for analyzing any claim asserted under it. The need for this
Article stems from the fact that First Amendment law is more than
ever a labyrinth. For students, lawyers, and judges alike, it is difficult
even to identify-much less to distinguish and apply-the various
strands of applicable precedent. This is because the Supreme Court
has developed a dense mass of overlapping doctrines: drawing distinc-
tions between content-based' and content-neutral 2 restrictions; draw-
ing further distinctions between fully-protected and "low-level"
categories of expression;3 creating separate bodies of precedent (over-
breadth,4 vagueness5 and prior restraint)6 that focus on impermissible
methods of regulation; requiring particular solicitude for controversial
speakers (the "hostile audience" cases);7 and creating special rules for
special settings (the public forum doctrine' and the discrete lines of
1. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (striking down, as a content-based
restriction on political speech, a District of Columbia statute banning the display of any sign
criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its embassy).
2. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding, as a con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, certain noise limits on concerts in New York
City's Central Park).
3. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-83 (1992) (acknowledging that the
Court employs a two-tiered "categorical" approach to direct restrictions on expressive content,
striking down such restrictions as presumptively unconstitutional unless the regulated utterance
belongs to a category of speech defined in advance as being unworthy of full First Amendment
protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (recognizing that certain
categories of speech are denied full First Amendment protection because they are "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of [only] slight social value as a step to truth...").
4. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 571, 577 (1987)
(striking down, on overbreadth grounds, a regulation prohibiting any person "to engage in First
Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport").
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 567-69 (1974) (striking down, on vagueness
grounds, a Massachusetts statute that criminalized publicly treating the American flag
"contemptuously").
6. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (striking down, as
invalid prior restraints, certain injunctions that barred the New York Times and Washington Post
from publishing excerpts from the "Pentagon Papers," a classified Defense Department study of
the Vietnam War).
7. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-13 (1969) (overturning disorderly
conduct convictions of eighty-five civil rights protesters whose peaceful march to and picketing
before the mayor's residence produced a hostile reaction by the approximately 1000 onlookers).
8. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992) (elaborating the public forum doctrine).
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precedent governing students,9 soldiers,1" prisoners, l a and public
employees).' 2
This Article sorts, identifies, and explains each of the foregoing
lines of precedent, while furnishing a framework that may be used in
analyzing any government restriction on speech. The analytical
framework is comprised of five questions that are designed to serve as
an issue-spotting checklist. After outlining this five-step inquiry in
Part II, the Article follows the same five-step path in Part III, offering
a detailed explication of the current law governing free expression.
II. OVERVIEW: A FIVE-STEP APPROACH TO FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
When confronted with any issue that implicates the Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, ask yourself the following five ques-
tions:13 (1) Is the regulation content-based or content-neutral? (2) If
content-based, does the regulation restrict speech or compel speech?
(3) If content-restrictive, is the regulation direct or indirect? (4) Does
the regulation include characteristics of overbreadth, vagueness, or
prior restraint? (5) Does the regulation pertain to one of the settings
for which the Supreme Court created special rules? This Part takes a
closer look at each of these five questions. After this initial overview,
each question will be analyzed in-depth in Part III. We start with
Question One, which inquires:
A. Is the Regulation Content-Based or Content-Neutral?
When the government regulates speech, it does so in one of two
ways: (1) by restricting expressive content,14 or (2) by restricting the
9. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 275-76 (1988) (elaborating
the special First Amendment rules governing student speech).
10. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360-61 (1980) (elaborating the special First
Amendment standard governing speech in the military).
11. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1987) (discussing the special First Amend-
ment standard governing speech by prisoners).
12. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (elaborating the special First
Amendment rules governing speech by public employees).
13. As a prelude to engaging in this five-step inquiry, you must confirm that you are dealing
with a government regulation of speech because the First Amendment does not apply absent
state action. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1995).
14. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329-32, 334 (1988) (striking down, as an invalid
content-based restriction, a District of Columbia statute that criminalized the display of any sign
criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its embassy).
[Vol. 29
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time, place, or manner of its expression. 5 Judicial hostility is much
greater to the former than the latter. 6 Accordingly, the best way to
begin any Speech Clause analysis is to determine whether the restric-
tion is content-based or content-neutral. The answer to this question
will dictate one of two divergent tests. In Laurence Tribe's famous
formulation, they are: (1) "Track One"' 7 analysis, requiring strict scru-
tiny for content-based restrictions, or (2) "Track Two"' 8 analysis, re-
quiring intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions. "The principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys."' 9 The
controlling factor is the government's purpose or intent.20
The Track One test for content-based restrictions2' is strict scru-
tiny. To survive judicial review, the restriction must be "necessary,
and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest. '2 2  The
Track Two test for time, place, and manner restrictions is a form of
intermediate scrutiny with three distinct prongs. To survive judicial
review under this test, the restriction: (1) must be content-neutral in
that it must be justified by the government "without reference to the
15. See, e.g., Stokes v. City of Madison, 930 F.2d 1163,1165,1173 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding
two sound amplification ordinances as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, despite
the "seemingly anomolous treatment of sound from churches and other exempted sources");
Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 88, 93-94 (4th Cir. 1972) (upholding an ordinance as a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that prohibited more than fifty people from as-
sembling in a small downtown park); Abernathy v. Conroy, 429 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (4th Cir.
1970) (upholding an ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that limited
parades to the hours between 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.).
16. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). The
First Amendment generally forbids the government from silencing a speaker based on the partic-
ular message's content. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1992) ("The First
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive con-
duct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presump-
tively invalid.").
17. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 791 (2d ed. 1988).
18. Id. at 792.
19. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
20. See id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986)).
21. Content-based restrictions on speech are governed by "Track One" strict scrutiny, un-
less the regulated utterance falls within one of the categories of "low-level" speech that does not
enjoy full First Amendment protection. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381-82. These "low-level"
speech categories include advocacy of imminent lawless action, obscenity, child pornography,
fighting words, defamatory statements, commercial speech, and lewd, profane, or indecent ex-
pression. See id.
22. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761.
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content of the regulated speech," 3 (2) must be "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest," 4 and (3) must "leave open
ample alternative channels for communicat[ing] the information. 25
In Part III A, this Article elaborates the standards for gauging
content-neutrality and the diverging levels of judicial scrutiny embod-
ied in Tract One and Track Two analysis. For now, we will resume our
overview of the five questions to employ as an issue-spotting checklist
for claims under the Speech Clause. After inquiring whether the reg-
ulation is content-based or content-neutral, we come to Question Two,
which inquires:
B. If Content-Based, Does the Regulation Restrict Speech or
Compel Speech?
If the regulation restricts rather than compels expressive content,
proceed directly to Question Three.26 But if the regulation compels
the utterance of, or identification with, a particular message or ideol-
ogy, it will face special judicial hostility under a cluster of cases involv-
ing government-compelled speech.27 This Article discusses the
compelled-speech cases in Part III B.
C. If Content-Restrictive, Is the Regulation Direct or Indirect?
When the government restricts the content of speech, it acts in
one of two ways: (1) directly restricting expressive content by target-
ing particular topics or viewpoints, or (2) restricting content indirectly
by punishing a speaker for the reaction produced by a controversial
message (the "hostile audience" cases).28 In either context, a court
will subject the restriction to heightened scrutiny.29 The reason for
distinguishing between direct and indirect restrictions on speech is
that each context has given birth to distinct bodies of precedent.
23. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.C.
27. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (striking
down a mandatory flag salute and pledge of allegiance statute directed at all children attending
West Virginia public schools). In striking down the statute, the Court famously declared, "[i]f
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id.
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1992) ("The First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
[Vol. 29
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The direct regulation of expressive content is exemplified by re-
strictions that prohibit the expression of certain political views (criti-
cizing a foreign government near its embassy,3° for example, or
expressing opposition to organized government 31 ), or restrictions that
target particular types or topics of speech (singling out hate speech,
for example,32 or labor speech).33
The indirect regulation of expressive content is usually accom-
plished by enforcing general prohibitions against undesirable con-
duct-statutes proscribing breach of the peace,34 disorderly conduct,35
or "annoying" pedestrians- 36 as a means of punishing controversial
speech. Such indirect regulations are exemplified in the famous "hos-
tile audience" cases. They hold that the expression of a controversial
viewpoint may not be criminalized merely because it prompts a vio-
lent reaction amongst onlookers enraged by the ideas expressed.37
30. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (striking down a District of Columbia stat-
ute that criminalized the display of any sign criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its
embassy).
31. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (striking down a statute that
criminalized the display of any "red flag, banner, or badge... [employed] as a sign, symbol, or
emblem of opposition to organized government..."). In so holding, the Court set aside the
conviction of a Youth Communist League member. See id. at 370.
32. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding unconstitutional an
array of ordinances prohibiting Nazi marches and the corresponding dissemination of Nazi
materials). The ordinances were invalidated because they were deemed impermissible content-
based restrictions on speech. See id. at 1202. Further, the court invalidated the prohibitions
against the dissemination of Nazi materials on overbreadth grounds. See id. at 1207.
33. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (invalidating an ordinance
prohibiting all but labor picketing within 150 feet of a school because the content-based ordi-
nance made "an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful
picketing").
34. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1963) (setting aside the
breach-of-the-peace convictions of 187 civil rights protesters who marched with placards reading
"down with segregation" and "you may jail our bodies but not our souls"). The marchers re-
fused to abide by a police order to disperse and were arrested after fifteen minutes of singing
and speech making. See id. at 240-41. In setting aside the arrests, the Court also held that the
government cannot criminalize "the peaceful expression of unpopular views." Id. at 237.
35. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 113 (1969) (overturning the disor-
derly conduct convictions of eighty-five civil rights protesters). The police ordered the protesters
to disperse because the officers could no longer contain the hostile reactions of 1000 onlookers.
See id. at 116. When the protesters refused, they were arrested. See id. Although the onlookers
became hostile and unruly, the protesters' conduct remained peaceful and lawful. See id. at 111.
36. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971) (striking down, as overbroad
and vague, an ordinance prohibiting sidewalk meetings by three or more persons conducted in
"a manner annoying to persons passing by" because "public intolerance or animosity" cannot be
the basis for abridging the rights of free speech and association).
37. The fountainhead in this line of precedent is Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
(1949). The Court reversed a breach-of-the-peace conviction of a widely vilified Christian Veter-
ans of America speaker who delivered an anti-Semitic and racially inflammatory speech in a
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When confronted with an indirect restriction on expressive con-
tent, apply the hostile audience precedents.38 When confronted with a
direct restriction on expressive content, employ Track One strict scru-
tiny- 9 unless the speech at issue falls into a category of "low-level"
expression that does not enjoy full First Amendment protection.40
The Supreme Court employs a two-tiered "categorical" approach
to direct restrictions on expressive content,41 striking down such re-
strictions as presumptively unconstitutional42 unless the regulated ut-
terance belongs to a category of "low-level" speech defined in
advance as being unworthy of full protection.43 There are seven cate-
gories of "low-level" speech. Some are utterly unprotected by the
First Amendment, while others are less-than-fully protected. The un-
protected categories are: (1) advocacy of imminent lawless action,44
(2) obscenity,45 (3) child pornography,46 and (4) fighting words.47 The
packed auditorium. See id. at 3-6. In reviewing the conviction, the Court observed that the
breach-of-the-peace ordinance "permitted [the defendant's] conviction ... if his speech stirred
people to anger, invited dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest." Id. at 5. The Court
concluded that "[a] conviction resting on any of those grounds cannot stand." Id.
38. See infra Part III.C.2.
39. See infra Part III.C.
40. See infra Part III.C.1.
41. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1992) (acknowledging that the
Court employs a two-tiered categorical approach to direct restrictions on expressive content,
striking down such restrictions as "presumptively unconstitutional," unless the speech falls
within a category of speech not receiving full First Amendment protection).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (establishing that advocacy of immi-
nent lawless action is unprotected speech under the First Amendment) Under the test estab-
lished in Brandenburg, states may prohibit illegal advocacy of only if that advocacy is both
intended and likely to produce "imminent lawless action." Id.
45. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing that obscenity is unpro-
tected under the First Amendment and adopting the modern test for obscenity). Under Miller,
speech is defined as obscene if it satisfies the following three-prong test: (1) the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest, (2) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (3) the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at 24-25.
46. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) (holding that child pornography is
unprotected speech under the First Amendment and deriving the test for child pornography
from Miller's test for obscenity). The Ferber Court's child pornography test modified Miller's
obscenity test in the following manner: "A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to
the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that the sexual conduct portrayed
be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole." Id. at 764. As with obscenity, however, the prohibited material "must be adequately
defined by the applicable state law, as written and authoritatively construed." Id.
47. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (limiting the definition of fighting words
established in Chaplinsky). Under Cohen, states may prohibit speech that is "inherently likely to
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less-than-fully-protected categories are: (1) defamatory statements,48
(2) commercial speech,49 and (3) lewd, profane, or indecent expres-
sion.50 Speech that falls within an unprotected category is generally
vulnerable to content-based regulation.51 But content-based restric-
provoke violent reaction" when the speech is "directed to the person of the hearer." Id.; see also
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words as "those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
48. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring a showing of
"actual malice" before a false statement about a public official or public figure will be deemed
defamatory). Public officials are precluded from recovering damages for "defamatory false-
hoods relating to [their] official conduct unless [they] can prove that [the statement was] made
with ... knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of [its truth]." Id.
49. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (adopting the prevailing test regarding commercial speech). The test for com-
mercial speech proceeds in four steps. First, is the commercial speech protected at all by the
First Amendment? This depends on whether: (a) it concerns lawful activity, and (b) it is not
misleading. See id. Second, is the asserted governmental interest substantial? See id. If the first
two questions are answered in the affirmative, then third, does the regulation of commercial
speech directly advance the asserted governmental interest? See id. If yes, then finally, can the
governmental interest be served by a more limited restriction on the commercial speech? If yes,
the regulation is invalid under the First Amendment. See id.
50. This category, often referred to as "indecent" speech, is not governed by any particular
test. Instead, judicial scrutiny of indecent speech varies depending on the medium of expression
and the context in which the speech is received. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16
(1971) (reversing the defendant's breach-of-the-peace conviction for walking through a court-
house corridor wearing a jacket bearing the words "fuck the draft"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (upholding the FCC's power to sanction a radio station for the daytime
broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane" language); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 206, 216 (1975) (invalidating an ordinance banning the showing of any films containing
nudity at drive-in theaters, where the screen was visible from a public street or place); Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989) (striking down an FCC
ban on "dial-a-porn" communications by stressing Pacifica's "emphatically narrow" holding);
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 869 (1997) (recognizing Pacifica's limitations by striking
down a ban on the Internet transmission of indecent communications); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1996) (entertaining a challenge to
three statutory provisions governing indecent, sex-related programming on cable television).
The Court: (1) upheld a provision permitting cable system operators to prohibit such program-
ming on leased access channels, (2) struck down a provision permitting cable operators to ban
such programming on public access channels, and (3) struck down a provision that required
cable operators to segregate such programming, place it on a single channel, and block that
channel from viewer access unless the viewer requests access in advance and in writing. See id.
at 733.
51. Note, however, that the government is not free, even within the confines of an unpro-
tected category of speech, to single out particular viewpoints for special prohibition and punish-
ment. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (holding that categories of
unprotected speech "can, consistent with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are categorized
speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the government may
proscribe libel [or some other unprotected category of speech]; but it may not make the further
content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.")
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tions are not necessarily valid when applied to the less-than-fully-pro-
tected categories.52 Such restrictions are gauged under the particular
form of intermediate scrutiny developed for each category. 53 Contin-
uing our overview of the issue-spotting checklist, we turn now to
Question Four, which inquires:
D. Does the Regulation Have Characteristics of Overbreadth,
Vagueness, or Prior Restraint?
The doctrines of overbreadth, vagueness, and prior restraint are
united by one common feature: each is concerned with an impermissi-
ble method of regulating speech. These doctrines focus not on the
content of speech, but on the regulatory means employed by the gov-
ernment in restricting that speech.
The overbreadth doctrine may be invoked to strike down restric-
tions on speech that are worded in such a way that even protected
expression is left vulnerable to punishment. 4 The vagueness doctrine
may be invoked to strike down restrictions on speech that are worded
in such a way that citizens cannot reasonably discern what is prohib-
ited.55 This Article discusses the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
in Part III D 2.
In reaction to the now-vilified press licensing systems of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries,56 the doctrine of prior restraint im-
poses severe limits on the power of government to regulate speech
52. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995) (striking down a con-
tent-based restriction on commercial speech). The Coors Court dealt with a labelling ban on
disclosing the alcohol content of beer, and found the ban inconsistent with the First Amendment
by failing to directly advance the governmental interest in preventing "strength wars" among
brewers. Id. at 478-80.
53. See infra Part III.C.1.
54. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569,
571 (1987) (striking down, on overbreadth grounds, a regulation prohibiting any person "to en-
gage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport"). The Court found the regulation sufficiently overbroad because it "prohibit[ed]
even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing." Id. at 574-
75.
55. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 571-72 (1974) (sustaining a vagueness challenge
to a Massachusetts statute that criminalized publicly treating the American flag "contemptu-
ously"). The Court observed that any "unceremonial" use of the flag might be regarded by some
as "contemptuous," but that casual treatment of the flag as "an object of youth fashion and high
camp" was commonplace. Id. at 573-74. Given the prevalence of these widely divergent views, a
statute criminalizing the "contemptuous" use of the flag was so vague that police, courts, and
juries were free to enforce it under their own preferences for treatment of the flag. See id. at
574-75.
56. See generally FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND: 1476-
1776 47-63 (1952) (describing press licensing in England).
HeinOnline  -- 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 232 1999-2000
20001 A FIRST AMENDMENT COMPASS
before it is uttered or published. 57 Prior restraints come in two forms:
(1) speech-restrictive injunctions,58 and (2) licensing systems that re-
quire a permit or fee as a prerequisite to engaging in expressive activ-
ity.59 This Article discusses the doctrine of prior restraint-and the
differing analytical standards for injunctions and licensing systems-in
Part III D 1. Concluding our overview of the issue-spotting checklist,
we turn, finally, to Question Five, which inquires:
E. Does the Regulation Pertain to One of the Settings for Which the
Supreme Court Created Special Rules?
In developing its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has created special rules for special settings. Each of the fol-
lowing settings is governed by its own discrete body of precedent: (1)
speech on public property (the "public forum" doctrine),6 ° (2) speech
in "restricted" environments (schools,61 prisons,62 and the military),63
(3) speech by public employees,64 (4) the regulation of communica-
57. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
58. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (striking down
injunctions barring the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing excerpts from the
"Pentagon Papers," a classified Defense Department study of the Vietnam War).
59. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 159 (striking down a parade permit scheme that
effectively vested unfettered discretion in licensing officials). "[I]n deciding whether or not to
withhold a permit, the [licensing authorities] were to be guided only by their own ideas of 'public
welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience."' Id. at 150. The
Court found that "a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior re-
straint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing au-
thority, is unconstitutional." Id. at 150-51.
60. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc: v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685
(1992) (describing the public forum doctrine applied to speech restrictions on public property,
while sustaining a ban on solicitation in an airport terminal deemed a nonpublic forum by the
Court).
61. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 256-66 (1988) (finding that
"[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mis-
sion"); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (holding that the wearing of
symbolic armbands by students in a non-disruptive manner is "closely akin to 'pure speech' [and
therefore] is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment").
62. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 121 (1977)
(holding that the Department of Corrections could prohibit inmates from soliciting other in-
mates to join the prisoner's union, bar meetings of the union, and refuse to deliver union publi-
cations without violating the First Amendment).
63. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353 (1980) (upholding an Air Force regulation
allowing a base commander to prevent communication that he believes threatens security).
64. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (recognizing that "the govern-
ment as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign" in
regulating the speech of its employees).
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tions media (print,65. broadcasting,66 cable television,67 and the In-
ternet), 68 and (5) government-funded expression.69
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The previous Part provided a general overview of the five-step
analytical approach presented in this Article. Now, these five steps
will be examined in far greater detail, with particular emphasis on the
finer points in each strand of precedent.
A. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Restrictions: Diverging
Levels of Judicial Scrutiny
This Section corresponds to Question One in our issue-spotting
checklist, which inquires whether the speech regulation is content-
based or content-neutral. Discussed here, in turn, are the implications
of content-neutrality (the diverging levels of judicial scrutiny under
Track One and Track Two analysis),7" and the standards for gauging
content-neutrality. 71
65. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247, 258 (1974) (declaring
invalid a Florida statute creating "a right to reply to press criticism of a candidate for election").
The Court stated that government regulation of "editorial control and judgment" cannot be
exercised consistent with the First Amendment under the facts of Tornillo. Id. at 258.
66. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 741 (1978) (holding that the FCC may
prohibit indecent speech on broadcast media in certain limited contexts); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-400 (1969) (citing spectrum scarcity as a justification for limiting the
speech rights of broadcasters and upholding FCC regulations requiring radio and television sta-
tions to afford airtime to political candidates and libel victims under certain circumstances).
67. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
68. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (holding that, "[n]otwithstanding the
legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materi-
als," statutes enacted to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" communica-
tions on the Internet improperly abridge First Amendment protections).
69. See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998) (up-
holding an NEA regulation requiring grant applications to be judged using "general standards of
decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values of the American public"). The Court found
the statute facially valid because "it neither inherently interferes with First Amendment rights
nor violates constitutional vagueness principles." Id. at 573. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 177-78 (1991) (denying a facial challenge to a Department of Health and Human Services
regulation limiting the ability of government funded clinics to engage in "abortion-related activi-
ties" and expression with patients).
70. See infra Part III.A.1.
71. See infra Part III.A.2.
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1. The Implications of Content-Neutrality: "Track One"
Versus "Track Two" Scrutiny
When the government regulates speech, it does so in one of two
ways: (1) restricting its expressive content, or (2) restricting the time,
place, or manner of its expression.72 Judicial hostility to the former is
much greater than to the latter.73 "It is axiomatic," the Supreme
Court has stressed, "that the government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. '7 a In regu-
lating speech, the government "may not favor one speaker over an-
other; '75 discrimination against speech because of its message "is
presumed to be unconstitutional. ' 76  When the government targets
not subject matter but, even more narrowly, particular views on a
given subject, the First Amendment violation "is all the more bla-
tant. ' 77 Viewpoint discrimination is thus "an egregious form of con-
tent discrimination. ' 78  Accordingly, the government "must abstain
from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction. "' 9
72. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329-32, 334 (1988) (striking down, as an impermis-
sible content-based restriction, a District of Columbia statute criminalizing the display of any
sign criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its embassy); Stokes v. City of Madison,
930 F.2d 1163, 1165, 1173 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding two sound amplification ordinances as rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions, despite the "seemingly anomolous treatment of
sound from churches and other exempted sources"); Blaseck v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 88,
93-94 (4th Cir. 1972) (upholding an ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tion that prohibited more than fifty people from assembling in a small downtown park).
73. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(recognizing that the government "may regulate expressive content only if such restriction is
necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest") (emphasis in original);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1992) (recognizing that "[c]ontent-based regula-
tions are presumptively invalid").
74. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(stating that "[t]he essence of ... censorship is content control. Any restriction of expressive
activity because of its content would completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."')
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
75. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; accord Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (examining "[t]he general principle that ... the
First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints
or ideas at the expense of others") (citations omitted).
76. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994) ("Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the
utterance of a particular message framed by the [g]overnment, contravenes [essential First
Amendment rights].").
77. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
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Thus, whether a speech regulation is content-based or content-
neutral will determine the level of judicial scrutiny to which it will be
subjected. In Laurence Tribe's famous formulation, content-based re-
strictions are subjected to "Track One" analysis (strict scrutiny), while
time, place, and manner restrictions are subjected to "Track Two"
analysis (intermediate scrutiny).80 This Article will take a closer look
at these tests momentarily-but first, let us examine the various guises
in which Track One and Track Two regulations appear.
Impermissible content-based restrictions appear in a variety of
guises. They may be grouped into five discrete categories. First,
where the government categorically suppresses or favors a particular
topic or message 81-as, for example, in Boos v. Barry,82 where a Dis-
trict of Columbia statute banned the display of any sign criticizing a
foreign government within 500 feet of its embassy.83 Second, where
the government serves as a content-conscious gatekeeper, selectively
blocking access to a forum based on the speaker's intended mes-
sage 84-as, for example, in Mahoney v. Babbitt,85 where the National
80. TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-2, at 791-92.
81. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 457-59 (1980) (striking down a statute singling
out peaceful labor speech for favored treatment while barring all other residential picketing);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123
(1991) (striking down New York's "Son of Sam" law that singled out the writings of accused or
convicted criminals depicting their crimes and funneled any profits therefrom to crime victims).
The Court found that, although "[t]he State's interest in compensating victims from the fruits of
crime is a compelling one .... the Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored to advance that
objective. As a result, the statute is inconsistent with the First Amendment." Id.
82. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
83. Id. at 318-19 (striking down the statute as an impermissible content-based restriction on
political speech).
84. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995)
(holding that a state may not single out a Ku Klux Klan cross and bar its placement in a tradi-
tional or designated public forum, where the cross is purely private and not a state endorsement
of religion); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391 (1993)
(striking down a regulation that denied a church group the opportunity to present a religious-
based film series in a designated public forum); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-69 (1981)
(invalidating a university policy that "discriminated against student groups and speakers based
on their desire to use a generally open public forum to engage in religious worship and discus-
sion"); Eagon v. Elk City, 72 F.3d 1480, 487-88 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the exclusion of a
partisan political sign in a public forum violated the First Amendment); Congregation Lubavitch
v. City of Cincinnati, 997 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1993) (singling out holiday displays by the KKK and
a Jewish organization); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(holding that an antiwar group has the First Amendment right to erect an antiwar display in a
public area near the White House); ACT-UP v. Walp, 755 F. Supp. 1281, 1284, 1292 (M.D. Pa.
1991) (finding that the state violated the First Amendment rights of AIDS activists by closing the
gallery of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives during the Governor's inauguration ad-
dress, while denying the motion for injunctive relief on procedural grounds).
85. 105 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Park Service sought to prevent anti-abortion protesters from display-
ing banners along the route of President Clinton's inaugural parade.86
Third, where the government subjects unpopular speakers to a higher
fee for using a forum87-as, for example, in Forsyth County v. Nation-
alist Movement,88 where, under a local permit scheme, the fee for po-
lice protection could be increased if the speaker was likely to generate
controversy. 89 Fourth, where the government withholds a service or
subsidy to which the speaker would otherwise be entitled if not for the
speaker's message-as, for example, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of University of Virginia,90 where a student religious journal was
denied the same subsidy for printing costs that the university fur-
nished to all other student publications. 91 Fifth and finally, where the
government alters the speaker's intended message as the price for use
of a forum 92-as, for example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian & Bisexual Group of Boston,93 where, as the price for securing
their permit, the private organizers of a St. Patrick's Day parade were
compelled by the government to include a contingent of gay and les-
86. Id. at 1458-59.
87. See, e.g., Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont,
700 F. Supp. 281, 286 (D. Md. 1988) (enjoining the Town of Thurmont "from imposing condi-
tions of insurance coverage, hold harmless agreements, indemnification, and police protection
and clean-up reimbursement on [a] KKK parade," where similar conditions were not imposed
on other parade permit applicants).
88. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
89. Id. at 134-35 (holding that the ordinance unconstitutionally required the administrator
to examine the content of the prospective speaker's message, and to charge a higher fee for
controversial viewpoints). The Court found that "the fee assessed will depend on the adminis-
trator's measure of the amount of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its con-
tent. Those wishing to express views unpopular with bottle throwers, for example, may have to
pay more for their permit." Id. at 134.
90. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
91. Id. at 827.
92. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Nation of Islam, 922 F. Supp. 56, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
(finding that the city's refusal to license its convention center for a "male only" congregation of
the Nation of Islam was unconstitutional because a mixed gender audience would necessarily
change the "content and character of the speech" by denying adherence to a "[sixty] year relig-
ious tradition"); New York County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp.
358, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (directing the City of New York not to interfere with the AOH's St.
Patrick's Day parade "by requiring the inclusion of any contingent [of paraders] which has not
been approved by the AOH and the Parade Committee"); Invisible Empire of the Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 286 (D. Md. 1988) (enjoining the Town
of Thurmont from imposing on the KKK conditions of insurance coverage, indemnification, and
reimbursement costs, where similar conditions were not imposed on other parade permit
applicants).
93. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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bian marchers, whose very presence would impart a message that the
organizers did not wish to convey. 94
Time, place, and manner restrictions come in many forms-im-
posing limits on the noise level of speech,95 fixing caps on the number
of protesters who may use a given forum,96 barring early-morning or
late-evening demonstrations,97 and restricting the size or placement of
signs on government property.98 Such restrictions are frequently up-
held and represent a common part of the regulatory landscape in most
cities.99
The Track One test (for content-based restrictions on protected
speech) 100 is strict scrutiny. 10 1 To survive judicial review, the restric-
94. Id. at 578-79 (finding a First Amendment violation because, by compelling the inclusion
of gay and lesbian groups as a condition for a parade permit, the government effectively altered
the expressive content of the organizers' parade).
95. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to noise limits on band shell concerts in New York City's Central Park);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1972) (upholding, as a valid content-neutral
restriction, an ordinance prohibiting noise making on grounds adjacent to schools); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding, as a valid content-neutral restriction, an ordinance
barring "sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and raucous manner on the streets"; Stokes v.
City of Madison, 930 F.2d 1163, 1172-73 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding an ordinance placing limita-
tions on the use of sound amplification equipment at outdoor rallies as "a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction, despite the seemingly anomalous treatment of sound from churches and
other exempted sources"); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding a
noise ordinance prohibiting the use of any hand-held amplifier within 150 feet of an abortion
clinic or other medical facility to be "narrowly drafted and... of sufficient precision so as to pass
constitutional muster").
96. See, e.g., Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 93-94 (4th Cir. 1972) (upholding an
ordinance that prohibited "the congregation of more than [fifty] persons at any time" in a small
downtown park as constitutionally reasonable in light of other alternatives).
97. See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 92 F.3d 1135, 1137 (11th Cir. 1996)
(upholding an ordinance banning Saturday morning parades as "a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction on speech"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058 (1997); Abernathy v. Conroy, 429
F.2d 1170, 1174 (4th Cir. 1970) (upholding an ordinance that limited parades to the hours be-
tween 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. as an "exercise of power consistent with the governmental prerog-
ative to regulate reasonably the time, place, manner, and duration of parades and marches").
98. See, e.g., United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513, 1517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge to a federal regulation prohibiting unattended signs in Lafayette
Park); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm'n v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1519-20 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(upholding regulations that limited "the size, construction, and placement of signs [during dem-
onstrations] on the White House sidewalk").
99. See Kevin Francis O'neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 Loyola L. Rev.
411, 475-78 (1999).
100. Content-based restrictions on speech are governed by "Track One" strict scrutiny, un-
less the regulated utterance falls within one of the categories of "low-level" speech that does not
enjoy full First Amendment protection. See TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-2, at 791-92. The catego-
ries of "low-level" speech include advocacy of imminent lawless action, obscenity, child pornog-
raphy, fighting words, defamatory statements, commercial speech, and lewd, profane, or
indecent expression. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
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tion must be "necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling
state interest.' 10 2 Application of strict scrutiny is almost always fatal
to the challenged restriction. 10 3 The Track Two test (for time, place,
and manner restrictions) is a form of intermediate scrutiny with three
distinct prongs."' To survive judicial review, the restriction: (1) must
be content-neutral (i.e., it must be justified by the government without
reference to the content of the regulated speech), (2) must be "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest," and (3)
must "leave open ample alternative channels" for communicating the
information.1"5 These three prongs require some further elaboration.
The first prong-content-neutrality-turns on "whether the gov-
ernment has adopted [the] regulation of speech because of disagree-
ment with the message it conveys."' 6 The controlling factor is the
government's purpose or intent.107 The second prong-narrow tailor-
ing-is by no means stringently enforced."0 8 Indeed, the Supreme
Court watered down this requirement in Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
101. See TRIBE, supra note 17, at 791.
102. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995); accord
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (recognizing
that regulations of speech in traditional public fora "survive only if they are narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest"); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (noting that "[b]ecause a principal purpose of traditional public fora is
the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclu-
sion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest").
103. For a rare example of a content-based restriction surviving strict scrutiny, see Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding a Tennessee statute prohibiting the solicitation of
votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place
entrance). The Court realized that the fundamental right of free speech was in direct conflict
"with the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud." Id.
Therefore, this restriction was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in prevent-
ing voter intimidation and election fraud. See id. But in his concurrence, Justice Scalia asserted
that strict scrutiny was not the appropriate standard to apply in this case. Rather, the statute
should have been sustained as a "reasonable, viewpoint neutral regulation of a nonpublic fo-
rum." Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (providing that time, place,
and manner restrictions are valid if they "are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information") (citations omit-
ted); TRIBE, supra note 17, at 791.
105. Id.; accord Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(recognizing the three-prong test for intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177 (1983) (recognizing the three-prong test for intermediate scrutiny).
106. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
107. See id..
108. See id. at 788-89 (noting that a narrowly tailored restriction "need not be the least re-
strictive or least intrusive means" but rather must merely promote "a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation").
HeinOnline  -- 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 239 1999-2000
240 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
cism,1 09 stressing that time, place, and manner restrictions need not be
the least restrictive or least intrusive means of achieving the govern-
ment's purpose.110 Rather, "the requirement of narrow tailoring is
satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial govern-
ment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regu-
lation.""11  This relaxed conception of narrow tailoring is vividly
reflected in the cases. Regulations that fail this test invariably feature
broad restraints on expressive activity-imposing, for example,
sweeping prohibitions on parades," 2 demonstrations, 1 3 residential
picketing," 4 door-to-door leafleting,"1 5 or public handbilling.' 16  A
good example is Bery v. City of New York," 7 where the Second Cir-
cuit enjoined enforcement of an ordinance that prohibited visual art-
ists from exhibiting or selling their work in public places without a
general vendors license." 8 The court held that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored, but instead served as "a de facto bar preventing
visual artists from exhibiting and selling their art in public areas of
New York,""' 9 because it placed an exceedingly low ceiling on the
number of available permits, creating a waiting list so long that even
the City conceded that the plaintiffs' prospects of securing a license
109. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
110. Id. at 798.
111. Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
112. See, e.g., Sixteenth of September Planning Comm'n, Inc. v. City of Denver, 474 F. Supp.
1333, 1335, 1341 (D. Colo. 1979) (striking down, as an impermissibly broad time, place, and
manner restriction, an ordinance banning parades within a seven-square-block central business
district during workdays from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.).
113. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. City of Valdosta, 861 F. Supp.
1570, 1580-81 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (invalidating an outright ban on public assemblies in all public
and quasi-public places other than parks as facially unconstitutional). The Court stated that a
prohibition that sweeps within its ambit all demonstrations on "streets, roads, highways, side-
walks, driveways, and alleys ... deprives citizens of the opportunity to express their views in
public forums particularly suited to open assembly, discussion, and debate." Id. at 1581.
114. See, e.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 52 F.3d 772, 773-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that anti-
abortion protesters were entitled to a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of an ordi-
nance banning picketing within 200 feet of a residential dwelling and authorizing year-long,
neighborhood-wide "no-picketing zones").
115. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943) (striking down an
outright ban on all door-to-door leafleting as impermissibly conflicting with freedom of speech).
116. See, e.g., Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking down,
for lack of narrow tailoring, a National Park Service regulation banning all leafleting on the
sidewalks surrounding the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, where the sidewalks were more than
100 feet from the Memorial's wall). In striking down the regulation, the Court noted that "'the
[government] interest in maintaining a tranquil atmosphere does not justify the prohibition
against the distribution of free literature.'" Id. at 1181 (citation omitted).
117. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997).
118. Id. at 698-99.
119. Id. at 697.
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were nonexistent.12° Absent this type of broad-based ban on a tradi-
tional form of expressive activity, courts routinely uphold time, place,
and manner restrictions as satisfying the narrow tailoring
requirement. 121
The third prong of Track Two analysis requires that the regulation
must "'leave open ample alternative channels for communicat[ing]"'
the speaker's message. 22 In applying this requirement, it must be
borne in mind that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place.' 1 23 Although a speech restriction may
run afoul of this requirement if it precludes "forms of expression that
are much less expensive than feasible alternatives,' 24 the basic test
for gauging the sufficiency of alternative channels is whether the
speaker is afforded "a forum that is accessible and where the intended
audience is expected to pass.' 1 25 A speech restriction does not leave
open ample alternative channels if the speaker is unable to reach the
intended audience. 126 Thus, a restriction may be invalid if it deprives
speakers of "a uniquely valuable or important mode of communica-
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
654 (1981) (upholding, as narrowly tailored, a state fair rule barring selling or distributing any
materials on the fairgrounds except from fixed booths rented on a first-come, first-served basis);
Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 92 F.3d 1135, 1140 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding, as
narrowly tailored, an ordinance banning Saturday morning parades because "ample alternative
channels of communication were available"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058 (1997); United States v.
Musser, 873 F.2d 1513, 1517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding a federal regulation prohibiting un-
attended signs in Lafayette Park because the "within three feet definition of attended ... ap-
pears sufficiently narrowly tailored").
122. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
123. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
124. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812
n.30 (1984); see, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (recognizing that
"door-to-door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little peo-
ple"). But the Supreme Court has stressed that its "special solicitude" for inexpensive forms of
communication "has practical boundaries." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n.30. "That
more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks . . . is not enough to
[insulate that method of communication from regulatory restrictions] when easy means of pub-
licity are open." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
125. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339 (W.D. Va. 1987);
accord Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that
"[a]n alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the intended audience").
126. See Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229; see also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at
812 ("[W]hile the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable
method of communication at all times and in all places, . . . a restriction on expressive activity
may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate") (citations omitted).
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tion,' 1 27 or if it "threatens their ability to communicate effectively."' 8
These principles are illustrated by the contrast between two cases: Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Incorporated v. City of Chicago129
and United States v. Fee.'3 °
In Martin Luther King Movement, a civil rights organization
sought to march through an all-white neighborhood, its previous foray
there having been curtailed when bystanders pelted the procession
with rocks, bricks, and explosive devices.1 3 1 City officials denied the
plaintiffs a permit for a second march through the same neighbor-
hood, proposing instead an alternate route through an all-black neigh-
borhood.132 Since the whole point of the plaintiffs' march was to
publicize and protest a pattern of violence against blacks attempting
to reside in or travel through the specified neighborhood, the court
held that the City's proposal for an alternate route-taking the plain-
tiffs away from that neighborhood and away from their intended audi-
encea33 -was constitutionally inadequate as an alternative channel of
communication. 3
4
In Fee, nine environmental protesters were convicted of willfully
defying a special order of the National Forest Service that closed a
sector of the San Juan National Forest to all expressive activity during
a 90-day period of active logging.' 35 The protesters had entered the
closed sector of the forest to protest the cutting of ancient trees
there.136  Rejecting the protesters' First Amendment defense, the
court upheld the special order as a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction.' 37 The order had been precipitated by prior protests in
which protesters occupied a tree for twelve days, locked themselves to
a cattle guard, blocked motor vehicles, rolled logs into the road, and
127. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
128. Id.
129. 419 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
130. 787 F. Supp. 963 (D. Colo. 1992).
131. Martin Luther King Movement, 419 F. Supp. at 672.
132. See id. (enumerating the reasons for the denial as" (1) the size of the parade;... (2) the
route the march was to take; [and] ... (3) the fact that a previous parade in the proposed area
had created problems for city authorities, including the police").
133. See id. at 673-74.
134. See id. (finding that "[t]he alternate route ... was the suggestion of a forum that had the
effect of depriving plaintiffs of their First Amendment rights").
135. Fee, 787 F. Supp. at 964-65 (establishing that certain defendants "deliberately entered
the portion of the forest that had been closed,... knowing that to do so was a violation of the
closure order").
136. See id. at 965.
137. See id. at 968-70.
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surrounded both loggers and trees to prevent cutting.' 38 In upholding
the order, the court concluded that it left open sufficient alternative
channels through which the protesters could communicate their mes-
sage.139 Though the protesters wanted to demonstrate "where the
trees were endangered,"' 40 they had been permitted to protest at the
point where the road entered the logging area. 14 1 This, the court held,
was constitutionally sufficient because it afforded these speakers the
requisite platform from which to convey their outrage at the felling of
ancient trees.
142
The guiding principle reconciling Martin Luther King Movement
and Fee is that a speech restriction will be struck down, as failing to
afford sufficient alternative channels of communication, only if it
largely impairs a speaker's capacity to reach an intended audience.
2. Gauging Content-Neutrality: Ward, O'Brien, and
"Secondary Effects"
Under Ward v. Rock Against Racism,'43 "[t]he principal inquiry in
determining content-neutrality . . . is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the mes-
sage it conveys."' 44 The controlling factor is the government's pur-
pose or intent. 145 Flunking the content-neutrality test was the speech
restriction in Boos v. Berry, 46 where the Supreme Court struck down
a District of Columbia statute that criminalized the display of any sign
criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its embassy. 147 The
Court held that the statute's display clause was content-based because
its sole justification was "to protect the dignity of foreign diplomatic
personnel by shielding them from speech that is critical of their gov-
ernments.' 48 This justification focused "only on the content of the
speech and its direct impact [upon] listeners.' 49 Thus, the statute
138. See id. at 964, 969.
139. See id. at 969-70.
140. Id. at 969.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 969-70.
143. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
144. Id. at 791; accord Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295
(1984) (finding that a restriction is constitutional if it "is content-neutral and is not being applied
because of disagreement with the message presented").
145. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1991).
146. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
147. Id. at 320.
148. Id. at 321.
149. Id. (emphasis in original).
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"must be considered content-based" because it "regulates speech due
to its potential primary impact."15°
By contrast, "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
effect on some speakers or messages but not others."' 151 "Govern-
ment regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' 1512
Employing these standards, courts have held that the following speech
restrictions-even though they imposed a greater hardship on particu-
lar speakers or messages-were nonetheless content-neutral: (1) a
noise regulation limiting the decibel level at Central Park concerts-
even though the restriction proved especially burdensome for rock
musicians-where the government's stated purpose was to preserve
the quietude of adjacent property;153 (2) a National Park Service ban
on camping in Lafayette Park and the Mall-even though its enforce-
ment against homeless advocates prevented them from sleeping over-
night in "tent cities" near the White House-where the ban's
underlying purpose was to maintain Washington's parks "in an attrac-
tive and intact condition;"' 54 (3) a regulation banning the overnight
maintenance of any "props" on the U.S. Capitol grounds-even
though it effectively thwarted a plan by homeless advocates to erect,
as part of a seven-day vigil, a 500-pound clay statue of a man, woman,
and child huddled over a steam grate' 55 -where the overnight ban
was justified as affording the government meaningful day-to-day con-
trol over the Capitol grounds;156 and (4) an order banning all expres-
sive activity within a sector of a national forest closed for logging-
even though the ban's impact was entirely one-sided, since only envi-
ronmentalists sought to protest among the trees157 -where the gov-
ernment justified its ban as protecting "health and safety and ...
property.' '1 58
150. Id.
151. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48
(1986)).
152. Id. (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984));
accord Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981).
153. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 781.
154. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295-96.
155. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 387 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
156. See id.
157. United States v. Fee, 787 F. Supp. 963, 969 (D. Colo. 1992).
158. See id.
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These cases illustrate that speech restrictions will be deemed
"content-neutral," even if they impinge more severely on a particular
speaker or message, so long as the government can justify its regula-
tion as serving purposes that have nothing to do with the content of
speech. Closely related to this theme are two strands of precedent
that directly implicate the question of content-neutrality: the secon-
dary effects doctrine and the O'Brien doctrine.
Under the secondary effects doctrine, a restriction on speech will
be deemed content-neutral, even though its language is content-dis-
criminatory, so long as the government's regulatory aim is unrelated
to the speech's communicative impact. 159 The secondary effects doc-
trine has been successfully invoked in the regulation of adult en-
tertainment establishments . 0  In Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Incorporated,6' the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance limit-
ing adult movie theaters to a concentrated area in the city.1 62  The
stated purpose of the ordinance was to avoid the spread of blight
caused by the proliferation of such theaters. 63 While conceding that
"the ordinance treats [adult] theaters ... differently from other kinds
of theaters," the Court upheld the ordinance because "[it] is aimed
not at the content of the films shown ... but rather at the secondary
effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.' 1 64 Since the
regulatory aim of the Renton ordinance was directed at the crime and
declining property values that frequently accompany adult theaters,
not the sexually explicit content of the films they exhibit, 165 the Court
concluded that the ordinance is "completely consistent with our defi-
159. See Young v. American Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding De-
troit's "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance"). The ordinance imposed a zoning restriction on the location
of adult theaters, forcing their dispersal to avert the creation of "red light" districts. Id. at 54-55.
The Court, in first adopting the doctrine, noted that "[it is the secondary effect which these
zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not dissemination of 'offensive speech."' Id. at 71 n.34 (em-
phasis added).
160. See id. at 72-73. But the secondary effects doctrine has had little impact on the right to
engage in public protest. In Boos v. Berry, the government invoked the doctrine unsuccessfully
when it sought to justify a ban on the display of any sign criticizing a foreign government within
500 feet of its embassy. 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988). The government argued that the ban was
content-neutral because "the real concern is a secondary effect, namely, our international law
obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their dignity." Id. at 320. But the Court
rejected this argument and invalidated the ban under strict scrutiny, holding that "[ljisteners'
reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton." Id. at 320-
21.
161. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
162. Id. at 48.
163. See id. at 43-44.
164. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
165. See id. at 48.
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nition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'"1 66
Like the secondary effects doctrine, the O'Brien doctrine erects a
shield of content-neutrality when the government regulates expressive
activity for reasons other than its communicative impact.167 Under
United States v. O'Brien,6 8 where the government regulates conduct
that has a communicative quality, the regulation will survive a First
Amendment challenge if the governmental justification for restricting
the conduct is important and unrelated to the suppression of ideas. 69
The O'Brien Court upheld a federal statute criminalizing the burning
of draft cards 17°-notwithstanding legislative history that revealed an
overriding impulse to punish such conduct precisely because of its
anti-war message- 1 7  where the government justified the prohibition
as furthering its administration of the Selective Service system.172
166. Id. at 48-49 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (emphasis in original).
167. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367-77 (1968).
168. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
169. Id. at 376-77. More precisely, O'Brien sets forth a four-part test for gauging the validity
of regulations directed at conduct comprised of both speech and non-speech components in
cases where the government has an interest in regulating the non-speech component. Id. at 377.
Such a regulation is justified: "[11 if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
170. Id. The defendant in O'Brien was sentenced to confinement for up to six years. See id.
at 369 n.2.
171. Id. at 383. Although the Court went out of its way to avoid examining the legislative
history, the floor debates leave little doubt about the intent of Congress:
What emerges with indisputable clarity from an examination of the legislative history of
the [draft-card-burning] amendment is that the intent of its framers was purely and
simply to put a stop to this particular form of antiwar protest, which they deemed ex-
traordinarily contemptible and vicious-even treasonous-at a time when American
troops were engaged in combat .... On the basis of this legislative history, it is not
open to doubt that the attitude of defiance manifested in the draft-card burnings was
what represented the threat seen by Congress, and that the infuriating offensiveness of
this mode of dissent was what drove Congress to prohibit it.
Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 15-16. Especially revealing are the remarks of Representative William G. Bray of
Indiana, who, during the floor debates asserted "[t]he need of this legislation is clear. Beatniks
and so-called 'campus cults' have been publicly burning their draft cards to demonstrate their
contempt for the United States and our resistance to Communist takeovers." Id. at 6 n.20 (quot-
ing 111 CONo. REc. at 19871-72).
172. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377-80.
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B. Restricting Expression or Compelling It: Special Judicial
Hostility to Government-Compelled Speech
This Section corresponds to Question Two in our issue-spotting
checklist, which inquires whether the regulation, if content-based, re-
stricts speech or compels speech. If the regulation is content-restric-
tive, proceed directly to Question Three, which inquires whether a
content-restrictive regulation is direct or indirect.173 But if the regula-
tion compels the utterance of, or identification with, a particular mes-
sage or ideology, it will face special judicial hostility under a cluster of
cases involving government-compelled speech.
The fountainhead in this line of precedent is West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,74 where the Supreme Court struck
down a mandatory flag salute and pledge of allegiance law directed at
all children enrolled in West Virginia public schools.175 The challenge
was brought by Jehovah's Witnesses, who refused to salute the flag on
religious grounds, because it required them to bow down before a
"graven image. '176 In one of the most famous passages in First
Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Jackson observed: "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein. '177
In Wooley v. Maynard,78 the Supreme Court struck down a New
Hampshire law that criminalized covering up the state motto, "Live
Free or Die," that was emblazoned on all state license plates.179 The
Court held that a state may not "constitutionally require an individual
to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by dis-
playing it on his private property in a manner and for the express pur-
pose that it be observed and read by the public." 180 Invoking
Barnette, the Court embraced a "freedom of mind" that protects an
173. See infra Part III.C.
174. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
175. Id. at 626, 642.
176. Id. at 629. The Court was sympathetic to the petitioners' claim, realizing that
"[c]hildren of this faith have been expelled from school and are threatened with exclusion for no
other cause. Officials threaten to send them to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined
juveniles. Parents of such children have been prosecuted and are threatened with prosecutions
for causing delinquency." Id. at 630.
177. Id. at 642.
178. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
179. Id. at 706-07.
180. Id. at 713.
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individual from being coerced by the state to convey an officially-
mandated ideology. 8'
More recently, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, 82 the Court held that Massachusetts could not
invoke its public accommodations law to force the private organizers
of a St. Patrick's Day parade to include a contingent of Irish gays and
lesbians.'83 The gay and lesbian group desired to march under a dis-
tinct banner and convey a message that the organizers did not wish to
impart."8 The Court concluded that compelling the inclusion of this
group would effectively alter the expressive content of the organizers'
parade-a type of compelled speech that violates the First
Amendment. 185
Closely related to the compelled-speech cases are those involving
the compelled revelation of a speaker's identity or associational mem-
bership. The most famous of these cases is NAACP v. Alabama,'86
where the Supreme Court struck down the enforcement of Alabama's
corporate "doing-business" statute," 7 by which the government
sought to compel the disclosure of the NAACP's membership list.
Likening such compelled disclosure to "'[a] requirement that adher-
ents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying
armbands,' '1 88 the Court asserted that "[i]nviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to
preservation of [First Amendment freedoms], particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs."' 89
This recognition-that the protective cloak of anonymity helps to
preserve the First Amendment freedoms of political minorities-
proved equally pivotal in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission9 °
and Talley v. California,'9 ' where the Court struck down bans on
anonymous leafleting.192 In Talley, which involved the distribution of
unsigned handbills urging readers to boycott certain Los Angeles
181. Id. at 714-15.
182. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
183. Id. at 559.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 572-73.
186. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
187. Id. at 451-52.
188. Id. at 462 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402
(1950)).
189. Id.
190. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
191. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
192. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65.
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merchants for engaging in discriminatory employment practices,193
Justice Black observed that "[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time
to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive prac-
tices and laws either anonymously or not at all."194 Writing for the
Court in McIntyre, Justice Stevens concluded:
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a perni-
cious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy
and dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals
from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hands of
an intolerant society.195
C. Direct Versus Indirect Regulation of Content: The Court's
"Categorical" Approach to Direct Restrictions; the
Hostile Audience" Scenario as in Indirect
Restriction
This Section corresponds to Question Three in our issue-spotting
check-list, which inquires whether the regulation, if content-restric-
tive, is direct or indirect. When the government restricts the content of
speech, it acts in one of two ways: (1) directly restricting expressive
content by targeting particular topics or viewpoints, or (2) restricting
content indirectly by punishing a speaker for the reaction produced by
a controversial message (the "hostile audience" cases). In either con-
text, a court will subject the restriction to heightened scrutiny.
The direct regulation of expressive content is exemplified by re-
strictions that prohibit the expression of certain political views (criti-
193. Talley, 362 U.S. at 61.
194. Id. at 64. The Court stated further that "[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures
and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind." Id. The Court cited
the experience of American colonists, who "frequently had to conceal their authorship or distri-
bution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by English-con-
trolled courts." Id. at 65. In fact, "[e]ven the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption
of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names." Id.
195. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (citations omitted). As in Talley, the McIntyre Court recog-
nized the historical value inherent in anonymous authorship by surveying a broad range of liter-
ary and political authors who chose to publish either anonymously or under pseudonyms,
including Mark Twain, Voltaire, George Sand, George Eliot, Charles Dickens, and during the
period surrounding our Revolution and founding "Publius," "Junius," "Cato," "Centinel," and
"The Federal Farmer." Id. at 341-43. Not yet resolved is whether the right of anonymous ex-
pression recognized in Talley and McIntyre extends to the realm of cyberspace. See, e.g., ACLU
of Georgia v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1232-35 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (striking down a state statute
that criminalized anonymous speech on the Internet).
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cizing a foreign government near its embassy, 96 for example, or
expressing opposition to organized government), 197 or restrictions that
target particular types or topics of speech (singling out hate speech,198
for example, or labor speech' 99).
The indirect regulation of expressive content is usually accom-
plished by enforcing general prohibitions against undesirable con-
duct-for example, statutes proscribing breach of the peace, 2°°
disorderly conduct,20 ' and "annoying" pedestrians-as a means of
punishing controversial speech. These are the famous 20 2 "hostile audi-
ence" cases.20 3 They hold that the expression of a controversial view-
196. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) (striking down a District of Columbia
statute criminalizing the display of any sign criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its
embassy as an improper content-based restriction on speech in a traditional public forum).
197. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931) (overturning the conviction of a
Youth Communist League member by striking down a facially vague state statute that criminal-
ized the display of any red flag, banner, or badge employed "as a sign, symbol, or emblem of
opposition to organized government").
198. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202-07 (7th Cir. 1978) (striking down, as content-
based and overly broad restrictions on speech, an array of ordinances enacted by the Village of
Skokie, including a prohibition against disseminating materials that promote hatred toward per-
sons on the basis of their heritage).
199* See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-94 (1972) (striking down, as a
content-based restriction on public forum speech, an ordinance that prohibited all picketing
within 150 feet of a school, except for picketing involving labor disputes).
200. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1963) (setting aside the breach-of-
the-peace convictions of 187 civil rights protesters who peacefully marched on a sidewalk around
the State House grounds). The protesters carried placards reading "Down with Segregation," "I
Am Proud to be a Negro." Id. at 235. They were arrested after failing to abide by a police
dispersal order prompted by a tense and angry crowd of 200 to 300 onlookers. See id. at 235-36.
The Court stated that the state may not "make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular
views." Id. at 237.
201. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969) (overturning the disorderly
conduct convictions of eighty-five civil rights protesters whose picketing before the mayor's resi-
dence resulted in a hostile reaction by 1000 onlookers). The Court held that the First Amend-
ment barred the protesters' convictions, notwithstanding the hostile reaction of the onlookers,
because the protesters remained peaceful throughout their demonstration and they were ar-
rested only after refusing a police dispersal demand prompted solely by the onlookers' unruli-
ness. See id.
202. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking down an ordinance, as
vague and overly broad, that prohibited sidewalk meetings by three or more people conducted
"in a manner annoying to persons passing by"). The Court observed that "mere public intoler-
ance or animosity" cannot be the basis for abridging the rights of free assembly and association.
Id. at 615.
203. Within this famous line of cases, the most prominent are: Gregory v. City of Chicago,
394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963); and Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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point may not be criminalized merely because it prompts a violent
reaction among onlookers enraged by the ideas expressed.2" 4
When confronted with an indirect restriction on expressive con-
tent, apply the hostile audience precedents.2 °5 When confronted with
a direct restriction on expressive content, employ Track One strict
scrutiny2°6 - unless the speech at issue falls into a category of "low-
level" expression that does not enjoy full First Amendment
protection. °7
1. Direct Regulation of Content: The Court's
"Categorical" Approach
The Supreme Court employs a two-tiered "categorical" approach
to direct restrictions on expressive content,20 8 striking down such re-
strictions as presumptively unconstitutional 2 9 unless the regulated ut-
terance belongs to a category of speech defined in advance as being
unworthy of full protection. 210 These "low-level" categories of speech
are denied full First Amendment protection because "such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas," and are of only
"slight social value as a step to truth."'211
There are seven categories of "low-level" speech. Some are ut-
terly unprotected by the First Amendment, while others are less-than-
fully-protected. The unprotected categories are: (1) advocacy of im-
minent lawless action,212 (2) obscenity,213 (3) child pornography,214
204. The fountainhead in this line of precedent is Terminiello v. City of Chicago, where the
Court reversed the breach-of-the-peace conviction of a widely vilified Christian Veterans of
America speaker who delivered an anti-Semitic and racially inflammatory speech in an audito-
rium filled with 800 people, while outside a crowd of 1000 "angry and turbulent" protesters
strained against a cordon of police. 337 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949). The Court found that the breach-of-
the-peace ordinance "permitted [the defendant's] conviction ... if his speech stirred people to
anger, invited dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest." Id. at 5. The Court concluded
that "[a] conviction resting on those grounds may not stand." Id.
205. See infra Part III.C.2.
206. See supra Part III A.1.
207. See infra Part III C.1 for a full discussion of "low-level" speech categories.
208. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (discussing the Court's two-tiered
categorical approach).
209. A law that regulates speech on the basis of its content is "presumptively invalid." Id. at
381-82.
210. See id. at 382-83 (discussing categories of speech that are not afforded full First Amend-
ment protection, including advocacy of imminent lawless action, fighting words, obscenity, defa-
mation, indecency, and commercial speech).
211. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
212. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (permitting punishment only for
speech that is intended to produce and likely to produce imminent lawless action).
2000]
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and (4) fighting words.215 The less-than-fully-protected categories are:
(1) defamatory statements,216 (2) commercial speech,217 and (3) lewd,
profane, or indecent expression.218 Speech that falls within an unpro-
213. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (adopting test for determining
whether speech is obscene and unprotected by First Amendment). Under Miller, expression is
obscene if it satisfies the following three-prong test: (1) "whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest," (2) "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law," and (3) "whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value." Id.
214. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (modifying Miller's obscenity test as
applied to child pornography). As in Miller, prohibited sexual conduct must be adequately de-
fined by the applicable state law. See id. But unlike Miller, a trier of fact need not find that the
material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person, the sexual conduct need not be
portrayed in a patently offensive manner, and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole. See id. at 764-65.
215. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (finding that "fighting
words" are utterly unprotected and defining fighting words as "those [words] which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"). Subsequent to
Chaplinsky, the Court narrowed the "fighting words" doctrine by essentially confining fighting
words to unambiguous invitations to brawl. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(finding that the defendant could not be punished for invoking fighting words because there was
"no showing that anyone who saw [the defendant] was in fact violently aroused or that [he]
intended such a result").
216. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (adopting "actual malice"
standard under which public officials are precluded from recovering damages for defamatory
falsehoods uttered in reference to their official conduct, unless they can prove that the statement
was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of [its truth]").
217. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (adopting the test for permissible regulations of commercial speech). In applying
the test, the Court asks first "whether the [commercial] expression is protected by the First
Amendment." Id. This will depend on whether the commercial expression concerns lawful ac-
tivity and is not misleading. See id. Second, the Court asks "whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial." Id. If the first two questions are answered in the affirmative, the Court
then asks "whether the regulation [of commercial expression] directly advances the governmen-
tal interest asserted." Id. If the answer to this question is "yes," the Court finally asks "whether
[the regulation] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve [the governmental] interest." Id.
If the regulation is more extensive than necessary, it is invalid under the First Amendment. See
id.
218. This category, often referred to simply as "indecent" speech, is not governed by any
particular test. Instead, judicial scrutiny of indecent speech will vary depending on the medium
of expression and the context in which the speech is uttered and received. See, e.g., Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment precluded the defendant's
breach-of-the-peace conviction for walking through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bear-
ing the words "Fuck the Draft" by refusing to "indulge in the facile assumption that one can
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the pro-
cess"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (upholding the FCC's limited authority
to sanction a radio station for the daytime broadcast of George Carlin's "filthy words" mono-
logue in which he repeatedly spoke the seven indecent words that "you couldn't say ... you
definitely wouldn't say, ever," on the air: "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and
tits"); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-14 (1975) (striking down, as overly
broad, an ordinance banning the showing of any films containing nudity at drive-in theaters
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tected category is generally vulnerable to content-based regulation. 19
But content-based restrictions are not necessarily valid when applied
to the less-than-fully-protected categories.220 Such restrictions are
gauged under the particular form of intermediate scrutiny developed
for each category. The following Section takes a closer look at each of
these "low-level" categories.
a. Advocacy of Imminent Lawless Action
The advocacy of illegal conduct is a category of speech that en-
joys no protection under the First Amendment. 221 Throughout much
of the twentieth century, this category was so broadly conceived that
dissident political speech fell within its ambit. It was used to criminal-
ize anti-war speech during World War 1,222 protests against U.S. mili-
where the screen is visible from a public street or place); Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (striking down an FCC ban on indecent "dial-a-porn"
communications by stressing the "emphatically narrow" holding in Pacifica and finding that
"[b]ecause the statute's denial of adult access to telephone messages which are indecent but not
obscene far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages...,
the ban does not survive constitutional scrutiny"); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866-70, 885
(1997) (invalidating a ban on the Internet transmission of "indecent" and "patently" offensive
communications because the "scarcity of available frequencies" and the "invasive nature" of
other forms of media recognized in Pacifica "are not present in cyberspace, [and] the interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but un-
proven benefit of censorship"); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 732-33 (1996) (upholding a provision permitting cable television operators to prohibit
indecent sex-related programming, but invalidating a provision permitting cable operators to
ban such programming from public access channels, and striking down a provision requiring
cable operators to place indecent programming on a single, segregated channel, where that chan-
nel was to be blocked from viewer access unless a viewer, in advance, requested access, as "not
appropriately tailored to achieve the basic, legitimate objective of protecting children from expo-
sure to patently offensive material").
219. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-86 (1992). But the government is not
free, even within the confines of an unprotected category, to single particular viewpoints for
special prohibition. See id. at 384.
220. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478-81 (1995) (striking down a
federal ban on disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels as a content-based restriction on
commercial speech not directly advancing the "governmental interest [in preventing malt liquor
alcohol strength wars] in a direct and material way").
221. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (permitting punishment for speech
that is intended to produce and likely to produce imminent lawless action).
222. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212, 216-17 (1919) (upholding a ten-year jail
sentence predicated on an Espionage Act conviction for a Socialist Party leader's expression of
anti-war sentiments during a public speech, where "the jury [was] most carefully instructed that
[it] could not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used
had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service
... and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his mind"); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 205-06, 210 (1919) (sustaining the defendant's Espionage Act conviction
and ten-year jail sentence for preparing and publishing anti-war articles in Missouri's German-
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tary intervention in the Bolshevik Revolution,223 radical labor speech
by the Industrial Workers of the World, 2 4 abstract calls for revolu-
225tionary mass action, and mere membership in the Communist
Party. 226 Gradually-through the influence of Justices Louis Bran-
deis22 7 and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.228 -the scope of this category
language newspaper that spoke of "the unconquerable spirit and undiminished strength of the
German nation, and characterized its own discourse as words of warning to the American Peo-
ple"); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49-53 (1919) (upholding the Espionage Act convic-
tion of a Socialist Party General Secretary who, in opposition to World War I, mailed draft-age
men certain leaflets urging resistance to the draft, denouncing conscription, and impugning the
motives of those backing the war effort).
223. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617-18, 624 (1919) (sustaining the Espionage
Act convictions of five defendants who distributed leaflets on the streets of New York City op-
posing U.S. military intervention in Russia to help overthrow the Bolshevik Revolution). The
leaflets denounced the intervention, advocated solidarity with the Russian workers, and urged
curtailment of the production of ordnance and ammunition to be used in the incursion. See id. at
617.
224. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE
ACLU 25-26 (1990) (recognizing that "[v]irtually all war critics were convicted and sentenced to
long prison terms," and because the "government directed its heaviest attacks against the Social-
ist Party and the IWW, neither [group] regained its prewar strength"); David M. Rabban, The
IWW Free Speech Fights and Popular Conceptions of Free Expression Before World War 1, 80
VA. L. REV. 1055, 1062-71 (1994) (recounting that "[o]fficials... responded to the free speech
fights ... by confiscating newspapers sympathetic to IWW positions, and by arresting people
selling those newspapers") (citations omitted).
225. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654-58, 672 (1925) (sustaining the conviction of a
member of the American Communist Party under New York's criminal anarchy law for writing
and disseminating a pamphlet, "The Left Wing Manifesto," that advocated revolution in the
abstract, but fell short of urging any specific, immediate illegal action).
226. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 366-72 (1927) (sustaining the California Crimi-
nal Syndicalism Act conviction of a woman who merely attended the convention of, and sought
to help organize, the Communist Labor Party of California), overruled in part by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
227. See id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stressing that advocacy of illegal action cannot
be criminalized unless the danger posed is imminent and "unless the evil apprehended is rela-
tively serious").
228. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (contending that advocacy of illegal
conduct may be legitimately suppressed only where it creates an "emergency that makes it im-
mediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time").
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was narrowed,229 such that it came to embrace only imminent and not
merely theoretical calls for illegal action.23 °
The prevailing test, established in Brandenburg v. Ohio,231 per-
mits punishment only for incitement that is both intended and likely to
produce "imminent lawless action. ' 232 Under this standard, the Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction of an NAACP official who, while
speaking to several hundred people in support of a boycott, said: "If
we catch any of you going in any of those racist stores, we're going to
break your damn neck. '233 The Court held that this speech, however
charged with emotion, did not transcend the bounds of Brandenburg
because it did not call for imminent lawless action.234 The Court
stressed that mere advocacy of illegal conduct down the road is not
enough to constitute advocacy of imminent lawless action.235
229. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382-83, 387 (1927) (overturning, as "an arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the state," the Criminal Syndicalism Act con-
viction of an IWW organizer, where the government's only proof was the defendant's possession
of the preamble to the IWW constitution, which advocated the need for class struggle between
"the working class and the employing class, [allowing workers to] take possession of the earth
and the machinery of production"); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 361-66 (1937) (reversing
the conviction of a defendant who had merely assisted in conducting a public meeting of the
Communist Party to support a longshoremen's strike, where the defendant was found to be
"entitled to discuss the public issues of the day and thus in a lawful manner, without incitement
to violence or crime, to seek redress of alleged grievances"); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
247-50, 261 (1937) (overturning the conviction of a Communist Party organizer found guilty of
inciting an insurrection as "an unwarranted invasion of the right of freedom of speech," where
the defendant only possessed pamphlets demanding federal unemployment insurance, social se-
curity, emergency relief for farmers, and equal rights for blacks, but containing no references to
violent revolution).
230. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961) (reversing a conviction for
membership in the Communist Party, where evidence did not establish that the Party engaged in
illegal advocacy, but rather "engaged in 'mere doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow'").
The Court stressed that "[t]he mere abstract teaching of Communist theory.., and of the moral
propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing
a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." Id. at 297-98.
231. 395 U.S. 444, 445-46 (1969) (overturning a Ku Klux Klansman's conviction under Ohio's
Criminal Syndicalism Act, where the defendant was videotaped at a Klan rally declaring that
"[i]f our [government] continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance taken").
232. Id. at 447. This test supersedes the "clear and present danger" test first adopted in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 350-52
(wherein the Court discusses and rejects the "clear and present danger," "bad tendency," and
"express incitement" tests adopted by the Court prior to its decision in Brandenburg).
233. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982).
234. See id. at 928.
235. See id. at 928-29. Two recent cases have tested the limits of Brandenburg's command
that only the advocacy of imminent lawless action is unprotected by the First Amendment. See
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 256 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Brandenburg was no
obstacle to a wrongful death action brought by the family of a contract murder victim against the
publisher of Hit Man, a book furnishing detailed instructions on how to commit a contract mur-
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b. Fighting Words and the Controversy over Hate Speech
Another category of speech that enjoys no protection under the
First Amendment is "fighting words," originally defined in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire23 6 as "those [statements] which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." '237 Chaplinsky is the first and last decision in which the Su-
preme Court has ever affirmed a "fighting words" conviction.238 Time
and time again-in Street v. New York,2 39 Cohen v. California,24 °
Gooding v. Wilson,2 4' Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,242 Lewis v. New Orle-
der, because the book "constitutes the archetypal example of speech which, because it methodi-
cally prepares and steels its audience to specific criminal conduct through exhaustively detailed
instructions on the planning, commission, and concealment of criminal conduct, finds no pre-
serve in the First Amendment"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998); Planned Parenthood v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1132-33 (D. Or. 1999) (issuing a per-
manent injunction shutting down an anti-abortion website that listed the names and addresses of
abortion providers, included photographs of doctors who performed abortions portrayed as old-
west style "wanted" posters, and crossed out the names of these doctors after they were mur-
dered). The court sidestepped Brandenburg at an earlier stage in the litigation by ruling that the
facts were governed by the body of precedent concerning "true threats." Planned Parenthood v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188-89 (D. Or. 1998). Concluding
that the website constituted an unprotected "threat," the court ruled that shutting down the
website would not offend the First Amendment. Planned Parenthood, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
236. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
237. Id. at 572.
238. Id. at 569, 574 (upholding the defendant's conviction under a state statute that, saved by
a narrowing construction, punished a spectrum of derisive statements no broader than "fighting
words," where the defendant called a city marshal "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned
Fascist").
239. 394 U.S. 576, 578-81 (1969) (vacating the defendant's conviction under New York's flag
desecration statute, where the defendant publicly burned an American flag in response to the
murder of a civil rights leader, as "unconstitutionally applied ... because it permitted [punish-
ment] merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the American flag"). The
Court found that the defendant's "remarks were [not] so inherently inflammatory as to come
within that small class of 'fighting words' which are 'likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace."' Id. at 592 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)).
240. 403 U.S. 15, 16-20 (1971) (overturning, as not likely "to provoke others to acts of vio-
lence," the defendant's breach-of-the-peace conviction for walking through a courthouse corri-
dor wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" because, "[w]hile [fuck] ... is not
uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not
'directed to the person of the hearer' [and no] individual... could reasonably have regarded the
words on [the] jacket as a direct personal insult") (citations omitted).
241. 405 U.S. 518, 519-20 (1972) (striking down, on vagueness and overbreadth grounds, a
Georgia statute criminalizing the use of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to
cause a breach of the peace" in the context of a clash between police and anti-war demonstrators
at an army induction center). While the police attempted to move the defendant away from the
facility's entrance, a scuffle ensued, during which the defendant exclaimed: "You son of a bitch,
I'll choke you to death,;" "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you," and "You son of a bitch, if you ever
put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." Id. at 524. In asserting that Georgia
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ans,243 Brown v. Oklahoma,24  and Texas v. Johnson- 245 the Court
rejected opportunities to breathe new life into the doctrine. If the
"fighting words" category is not entirely dead, as many scholars be-
lieve, 246 it is at least limited now to unambiguous invitations to
brawl 247 specifically directed by one person to another.248
In the 1980s, advocates for hate speech regulations attempted to
revitalize the fighting words doctrine-only to fail miserably. In the
wake of Doe v. University of Michigan249 and R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul,2 5 0 efforts to regulate hate speech would appear to be futile-
either because such prohibitions are inherently vulnerable to over-
courts failed properly to limit the statute's reach, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, further
limited the scope of the "fighting words" doctrine by confining it to words having "a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed."
Id.
242. 408 U.S. 901, 901-04 (1972) (invoking Gooding and vacating the conviction of a defen-
dant who used the word "mother-fucker" during a public school board meeting on four occas-
sions-to describe the teachers, the school board, the town, and the county).
243. 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (invoking Gooding and vacating the conviction of a woman
who called the officers "God damn mother fuckers" during her son's arrest).
244. 408 U.S. 914, 917 (1972) (invoking Gooding and vacating the conviction of a Black
Panther who called police officers "mother fucking fascist pig cops" during his arrest).
245. 491 U.S. 397, 402-06 (1989) (striking down a Texas flag desecration statute by holding
that the defendant's flag burning during a rally protesting President Reagan was expressive con-
duct under the First Amendment because the government's asserted interests were insufficient
to controvert First Amendment guarantees). The Court rejected the notion that flag burning
falls "within that small class of 'fighting words' that are 'likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace,'.., or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs."
Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
246. See, e.g., Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 536
(1980) (describing the "fighting words" doctrine as "nothing more than a quaint remnant of an
earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free
expression").
247. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (limiting the fighting words doctrine to "a direct personal
insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (find-
ing a provocative epithet insufficient for "fighting words" and requiring a more direct personal
affront).
248. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (finding that, for the "fighting words"
doctrine to apply, a statement must be specifically and individually directed to a particular
target).
249. 721 F. Supp. 852, 853, 886-87 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down, on overbreadth and
vagueness grounds, a campus hate speech code prohibiting "'stigmatizing or victimizing' individ-
uals or groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status").
250. 505 U.S. 377, 380, 396 (1992) (striking down an ordinance criminalizing "bias-motivated
disorderly conduct" that singled out the public display of symbols that "arouse anger, alarm, or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender"). The Court ruled
that the statute was fatally flawed because it singled out a particularized list of hateful sentiments
as a form of "content-based, even viewpoint-based, discrimination." Id. at 394.
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breadth and vagueness challenges,25' or because they necessarily en-
tail a form of viewpoint discrimination that is presumptively
unconstitutional. 52
c. Obscenity, Pornography, and Profanity
This Section considers three distinct categories of low-level
speech: obscenity, child pornography, and lewd, profane, or indecent
expression. Speech will not be deemed unprotected merely because it
is overtly sexual. 3  Within the broad spectrum of sexually explicit
material, only the narrow subsets of obscenity254 and child pornogra-
phy2 55 may be criminalized. The Supreme Court's struggle to define
obscenity-once prompting Justice Potter Stewart to declare "I know
it when I see it" 5 6-ultimately convinced some members of the Court
that the government cannot legitimately regulate sexual expression at
all.2 57 But such a view has never commanded a majority of the Court,
and the test for obscenity announced in 1973 remains the standard
today. That test, from Miller v. California,25 8 provides that expression
will be deemed obscene, and hence utterly unprotected by the First
Amendment, if it satisfies each of the following three elements: (1)
251. See, e.g., Doe, 721 F. Supp. 852, 886-87 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down a campus hate
speech code on vagueness and overbreadth grounds).
252. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (1992) (invalidating hate speech ordinance because
content-based or viewpoint-based regulations of speech are presumptively unconstitutional, un-
less such regulations survive strict judicial scrutiny).
253. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (reversing the obscenity conviction
of a film exhibitor for showing "Carnal Knowledge, a highly-acclaimed Hollywood film that
contained occasional scenes of nudity, but no graphic depictions of sexual intercourse, on the
grounds that obscenity prosecutions cannot be premised on materials that fall short of hard-core
sexual acts squarely depicted).
254. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973) (holding that obscenity is unprotected by
the First Amendment and providing that an obscenity prosecution requires that the purportedly
obscene materials "depict or describe patently offensive 'hardcore' sexual conduct specifically
defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed").
255. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (finding that "[w]hen a definable class
of material.., bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its produc-
tion, . . . the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and [it is] permissible to consider
these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment").
256. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
257. See Liles v. Oregon, 425 U.S. 963, 965 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing "the
difficulty and arbitrariness inherent in any attempt to articulate a standard of obscenity"); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding no constitu-
tional basis for a rule making people "criminally responsible" for failing "to take affirmative
steps to protect the consumer against literature, books, or movies offensive to those who tempo-
rarily occupy the seats of the mighty"); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (finding that an obscenity conviction for "exhibiting a motion picture [containing
nudity] abridges the freedom of the press as safeguarded by the First Amendment").
258. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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"the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest,"'259 (2) the work "depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way,"26° sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (3) "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. ' 261
In a less-than-helpful elaboration of the first prong, the Court
stressed that a "prurient" interest in sex is one that is "shameful or
morbid" rather than "normal" and "healthy. '262 The "patently offen-
sive" requirement in prong two is gauged under local community stan-
dards, 263 but the "lacks serious ... value" requirement in prong three
is judged under a national, objective test.264 Though the private pos-
session of obscene material is protected from prosecution,265 the pub-
lic exhibition of such material-even in a theater open only to
consenting adults-is not.266 Likewise, there is no protection for im-
porting,267 transporting, 268 or distributing2 69 obscene material, even if
solely for private use.270
Under New York v. Ferber,27' child pornography may be criminal-
ized under the Miller obscenity test as modified in the following
ways.272 As under Miller, the prohibited conduct must be adequately
defined by a state statute.273 But unlike Miller, a trier of fact need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average
274person.  Further, it is not required that the sexual conduct be por-
trayed in a patently offensive manner,275 and the material at issue
need not be considered as a whole.2 76  In another departure from
259. Id. at 24.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1985).
263. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 302 (1977).
264. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
265. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that "statutes regulating ob-
scenity ... do not ... reach into the privacy of one's own home").
266. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973).
267. See United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973).
268. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973).
269. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971).
270. See 12 200 Foot Reels, 413 U.S. at 128.
271. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
272. Id. at 764-65.
273. See id. at 764.
274. See id. at 764-65.
275. See id. at 765.
276. See id.
20001
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traditional obscenity precedents, even the private possession of child
pornography may be criminalized. 27
In a unique ordinance drafted by feminist scholars, the City of
Indianapolis attempted to ban all pornography as a species of hate
literature.278 The ordinance defined "pornography" as:
[T]he graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in
pictures or in words, that also includes, one or more of the following
... (1) women .. .presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or
humiliation; (2) women ... presented as sexual objects who experi-
ence sexual pleasure in being raped; (3) women ... presented as
sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically
hurt...; (4) women.., presented as being penetrated by objects or
animals; (5) women ... presented in scenarios of degradation, in-
jury, abasement, torture ... ; or (6) women.., presented as sexual
objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession,
or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or
display.279
In striking down this ordinance, the Seventh Circuit held that its re-
strictions were viewpoint-based 280 because "[s]peech that 'subordi-
nates' women [is] forbidden, [but speech] that portrays women in
positions of equality is lawful," no matter how graphic the sexual con-
tent.2 8' This, the court concluded, is "thought control. Those who es-
pouse the approved view may use sexual images; those who do not,
may not. 12 82
Turning, finally, to lewd, profane, or indecent expression, this
"low-level" category is not governed by any particular test. Neverthe-
less, the cases do permit a few conclusions about how such speech will
be treated in the courts. Under Cohen v. California,283 profanity in
the service of core political speech will receive heightened indul-
277. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (recognizing that, "[g]iven the gravity of
the State's interests in this context, [it is permissible to] constitutionally proscribe the possession
and viewing of child pornography").
278. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1985).
279. Id. at 324.
280. See id. at 332-33.
281. Id. at 328.
282. Id. The court found that, in enacting the ordinance, the legislature acted as director of
approved viewpoints, regulating noxious sentiment to promote the purification of our culture.
See id. at 328-30. The Court refused to declare government "the great censor and director of
which thoughts are good for us." Id. at 330.
283. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
[Vol. 29
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gence 284-and the government cannot remove certain profane words,
like "fuck," from the lexicon of public discourse.285 Conversely,
Young v. American Mini-Theatres,286 Renton v. Playtime Theatres,287
and Barnes v. Glen Theatre288 indicate that, when it comes to adult
threaters and nude dancing, courts will be especially deferential to re-
strictions that are justified as targeting the harmful "secondary ef-
fects" of such establishments. The cases featuring broadcast,289
cable, 29° and Internet 291 regulation of "indecency" make clear that ju-
dicial scrutiny will vary depending on the medium of expression. Fi-
nally, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,292  Erznoznik v. City of
284. Id. at 16-20 (overturning the defendant's breach-of-the-peace conviction for walking
through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" as an invalid
content-based restriction on speech).
285. See id.
286. 427 U.S. 50, 70-73 (1976) (upholding a zoning restriction on the location of adult thea-
ters that forced their dispersal to prevent the creation of "red light" districts). The Court upheld
the restriction because "[it is [the] secondary effects [of adult theaters] it attempts to avoid, not
the dissemination of 'offensive speech."' Id. at 71 n.34.
287. 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (upholding, as a content-neutral restriction, a zoning ordi-
nance requiring the concentration of adult movie theaters, where the regulatory aim of the ordi-
nance was directed at the crime and declining property values frequently accompanying adult
theaters, not the sexually explicit nature of the films exhibited in such theaters).
288. 501 U.S. 560, 565-67, 581 (1991) (upholding Indiana's public indecency statute as ap-
plied to nude dancing, where the statute required dancers to wear pasties and G-strings, on the
grounds that nude dancing is only marginally within the ambit of the First Amendment and the
ordinance only minimally restricted the expressive abilities of the dancers). In a pivotal concur-
rence, Justice Souter focused "not on the possible sufficiency of society's moral views [as a regu-
latory justification], but on the State's substantial interest in combating the secondary effects of
adult entertainment establishments of the sort typified [here]." Id. at 582 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
289. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747-48 (1978) (upholding the FCC's authority
to sanction a radio station for the daytime broadcast of George Carlin's "filthy words" mono-
logue by stressing the sharply diminished speech rights of broadcasters vis-a-vis their counter-
parts in the print media).
290. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 733 (1996)
(striking down two of three provisions governing indecent, sex-related programming on cable
television). The plurality opinion leaves open the possibility that a lesser First Amendment stan-
dard may eventually apply to cable television operators.
291. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down, as an unconstitutional
abridgment of free speech, a ban on the Internet transmission of indecent communications). The
Court found that the factors justifying heightened regulation of broadcast media are not present
in cyberspace. See id. at 868-70. These factors include a history of extensive government regula-
tion of broadcasting, the scarcity of available frequencies at inception, and the "invasive" nature
of the medium. See id. In the absence of these factors, there is no basis for qualifying the level
of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to content-based restrictions on Internet
speech. See id. Accordingly, speech in cyberspace enjoys the same enhanced protection as that
reserved for the print media. See id.
292. 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (upholding the FCC's authority to sanction a radio station
for the afternoon broadcast of George Carlin's "filthy words" monologue because it was trans-
mitted at a time of day when children would likely be listening). The Court stressed that the
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Jacksonville,293  Sable Communications v. FCC,294  and Reno v.
ACLU 295 demonstrate that indecent speech faces greater judical hos-
tility the more it is seen to bombard an unwilling audience.
d. Commercial Speech
The prevailing test for commercial speech is derived from Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of
New York. 296 Commercial speech-which the court defined as "ex-
pression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience" 29 7-usually means commercial advertising. Any restriction
on commercial speech must satisfy the test articulated in Central Hud-
son. The test proceeds in four steps. First, is the advertisement pro-
tected at all by the First Amendment? 298 Such protection is withheld
unless the advertisement concerns lawful activity and is not mislead-
ing.299 Second, is the asserted governmental interest in regulating the
speech "substantial"? 3" If the first two questions are answered yes,
then third, does the regulation directly advance the asserted govern-
broadcast media "have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."
Id. at 748. Further, "indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not
only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of the intruder." Id. The Court's holding turned
on the fact that, "[b]ecause the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warn-
ings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content [and] ...
broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read." Id. at 748-49.
293. 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) (striking down, as facially invalid, an ordinance banning the
showing of any films containing nudity at drive-in theaters, where the screen was visible from a
public street or place). The Court found that "the limited privacy interests of persons on the
public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its
content." Id. at 212. In so ruling, the Court rejected the city's argument that it was free to
protect the public, as a "captive audience," from exposure to offensive speech, because: (1) the
regulated expression does not bombard the home and it does not affect an audience trapped in
an enclosed space, and (2) the state is sharply limited in its ability to single out one type of
supposedly "offensive speech" and banning it alone. See id. at 209-10.
294. 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (striking down, as not narrowly tailored, an FCC ban on inde-
cent "dial-a-porn" communications). The Court stressed that, in contrast to broadcasting, where
a person can turn on the radio and be taken by surprise by an indecent message, "the dial-it-
medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication." Id. at 127-
28.
295. 521 U.S. 844, 868-69 (1997) (striking down the Communication and Decency Act's ban
on indecent Internet communications because, in contrast to broadcasting, "'communications
over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen un-
bidden"') (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
296. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
297. Id. at 561 (citations omitted).
298. See id. at 566.
299. See id.
300. Id.
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mental interest?301 If yes, then fourth and finally, could the govern-
mental interest be served by a more limited restriction on the
speech?30 2  If so, the regulation is invalid under the First
Amendment. °3
In applying the Central Hudson test, bear in mind that the Su-
preme Court has relaxed its enforcement of the fourth prong, no
longer treating it as a "least restrictive means" test.30 4 But the Court
will strike down, as overly paternalistic, those regulations in which the
government broadly proscribes the dissemination of prices305 or other
consumer-oriented information regarding the contents or characteris-
tics of a product.30 6
e. Tortious Expression: Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and
Infliction of Emotional Distress
Throughout much of our history, critics of government sought in
vain to establish legal protection for their utterances.30 7 Prior to 1804,
even a truthful statement was no defense to a seditious libel prosecu-
tion.30 8 But in the rough and tumble of political debate, even false-
hoods may be blurted out in the heat of the moment. In New York
Times Company v. Sullivan, ° 9 the Supreme Court took the momen-
tous step of affording limited legal protection to false statements ut-
tered by critics of government officials.310 In Sullivan, the Court
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 561.
304. See Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (holding that the fourth
prong of Central Hudson's test is satisfied where the regulation is "reasonable," with a scope "in
proportion to the interest served," or where the regulation employs "a means narrowly tailored
to achieve the desired objective").
305. Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (striking down a Virginia statute banning pharmacists from publishing any price informa-
tion about prescription drugs, which effectively thwarted any dissemination of prescription drug
prices, because only licensed pharmacists were authorized to disperse such drugs).
306. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (striking down a
state law banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices because the statute was not suffi-
ciently tailored to meet its stated objectives); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490-91
(1995) (striking down, as not directly advancing the governmental interest in preventing malt
liquor "strength wars," a federal ban on the disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels).
307. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 3-15 (1985) (tracing
the bleak history of restrictions on seditious speech).
308. It was not until Alexander Hamilton's pioneering accomplishment in People v. Cros-
well, 3 Johns. Cases 336 (N.Y. 1804) that a judicial decision recognized that truth should be a
defense to a charge of seditious libel. Id. at 376-77, 393-94.
309. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
310. Id. at 279-80 (holding that a public official is prohibited from "recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
2000]
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reversed a $500,000 libel award to a Southern official who, following a
clash with civil rights demonstrators, identified certain factual inaccu-
racies in a published advertisement recounting the event.311 Though
most of the inaccuracies were trivial,312 the advertisement did accuse
local police officers of padlocking a campus dining hall when in fact
they never did.313 The issue before the Court was whether that type
of falsehood, uttered in the heat of a civil rights protest, should leave
the speakers vulnerable to a huge libel award.31 4
Recognizing "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government officials, '315 the Court es-
tablished qualified protection for defamatory falsehoods uttered by
critics of government officials. 316 The Court observed that "erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, [and that] it must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need ... to survive.'" 317 As such, the Court held that public officials
are precluded from recovering damages for defamatory falsehoods ut-
tered in reference to their official conduct unless they can prove "that
the statement was made ... with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of [its truth]. 318
This "Times malice" standard extends not only to public officials
but also to public figures319 (i.e., people who are "intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their
fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large"). 320 As for
libel actions by purely private figures, the Times malice standard limits
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not").
311. Id. at 256-57.
312. The advertisement incorrectly asserted that the students sang "My Country, 'Tis of
Thee" during demonstrations at the Georgia State Capitol and that Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. was arrested seven times. See id. at 258. In actuality, the students sang the "Star Span-
gled Banner" and King was arrested on only four occasions. See id. at 258-59.
313. See id. at 259.
314. See id. at 271.
315. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
316. See id. at 264-65.
317. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). The Court further
recognized that "compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to...
'self-censorship."' Id. at 279.
318. Id. at 279-80.
319. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
320. Id.
[Vol. 29
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only the availability of punitive damages; compensatory damages may
be awarded merely upon proof that the falsehood was published negli-
gently.321 The Times malice standard has-now been extended to other
tortious statements-including false light invasions of privacy 322 and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.323
2. Indirect Regulation of Content: The "Hostile
Audience" Cases
In contrast to direct regulation of expressive content, which is
usually accomplished by restrictions affirmatively suppressing a partic-
ular message,324 content is regulated indirectly by punishing a speaker
for the reaction to the speaker's controversial speech.325 These are the
so-called "hostile audience" cases, which hold that the expression of a
controversial viewpoint may not be criminalized merely because it
prompts a violent response amongst onlookers enraged by the ideas
expressed.326
321. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-49 (1974).
322. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376-77, 387-88 (1967) (addressing the false light
actionability of a magazine article reporting that "a new play portrayed [a true-crime] experience
suffered by [the plaintiff] and his family," and holding that a state statute may not "redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the
report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth"); Cantrell v. Forest City
Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 247, 251-52 (1974) (addressing the false light actionability of a series of
newspaper articles stressing the plaintiff's "abject poverty" in interviews covering the accidental
death of the plaintiffs husband, and applying Sullivan's actual malice standard to reject the
common law's malice standard that focused on "the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiffs
privacy [instead of] the truth or falsity of the material published").
323. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declining to find "a state's
interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress ... sufficient to deny First Amend-
ment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury,
even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about
the public figure involved"). In Hustler, the Court dealt with disparaging remarks about Jerry
Falwell appearing in a parodic ad in the magazine. See id. at 48. The Court held that "public
figures and public officials may not recover [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] with-
out showing ... actual malice." Id. at 56.
324. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315, 334 (1988) (striking down, as an impermissibe
content-based restriction, a District of Columbia statute criminalizing the display of any sign
criticizing a foreign government within 500 feet of its embassy).
325. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1997) (recognizing that the Court will not
permit "the government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot,
[but] requires careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression,
asking whether the expression 'is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to [do so]"') (citation omitted).
326. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (recognizing that the
Constitution "does not permit a state to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular
views"); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (overturning a flag-burning conviction on the grounds that "the
government may [not] ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported pre-
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The fountainhead in this line of precedent is Terminiello v. City of
Chicago,32 7 where the Supreme Court reversed the breach-of-the-
peace conviction of a widely vilified speaker whose anti-Semitic and
racially inflammatory speech produced a near riot.328 Calling his an-
tagonists "'slimy scum,' 'snakes,' [and] 'bedbugs,' ,329 the defendant
delivered a venomous speech to an auditorium packed with 800 sup-
porters,33 ° while outside, straining against a cordon of police, "'a surg-
ing, howling mob [of 1000 people] hurl[ed] epithets' at individuals
attempting to enter and 'tried to tear their clothes off."' 33 At trial,
the defendant's conviction followed a jury instruction that authorized
punishment for speech that "'stirs the public to anger, invites dispute,
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance. ' '33 2
Holding that this instruction violated the First Amendment,333 the
Court declared:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger .... That is why freedom
of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear
and present danger of serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.334
Two years later, in an apparent retreat from Terminiello, the
Court decided Feiner v. New York,3 35 which upheld the disorderly con-
duct conviction of a college student whose streetcorner harangue pro-
duced racial friction among eighty onlookers.336 But the Court's
sumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence .... [Nor may the government]
assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot.")
327. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
328. Id. at 2-3, 6.
329. Id. at 26.
330. See id. at 3.
331. Id. at 16.
332. Id. at 3 (quoting trial court's jury instruction).
333. See id. at 2-3.
334. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
335. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
336. Id. at 321. The defendant stood atop a soapbox and, with a loudspeaker, gave a street
corner speech to approximately eighty onlookers. See id. at 316-17. The speech included derog-
atory remarks about President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other
local officials. See id. at 317. The speech inspired a hostile reaction from the onlookers. See id.
The Court upheld the conviction on the grounds that the defendant encouraged his audience to
become racially divided, the gathering interfered with traffic, and the defendant repeatedly re-
fused police orders to cease speaking. See id. at 319 n.2. But in dissent, Justice Black com-
mented that "[i]t is neither unusual nor unexpected that some people at public meetings mutter,
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subsequent decisions-in Edwards v. South Carolina,337 Cox v. Loui-
siana,338 and Gregory v. City of Chicago339-have reinforced the vital-
ity of Terminiello, overturning the convictions of equally unpopular
speakers who prompted equally hostile reactions by equally sizable
crowds.
Feiner's contrary result is attributable to one crucial fact that sets
it apart from the other cases: The speaker encouraged his audience to
become racially divided into hostile camps.34° In other words, the
speaker engaged in a mischievous, bad faith effort to produce violent
clashes among his listeners. 341 From a First Amendment perspective,
such behavior is fundamentally different from the expression of pro-
vocative ideas-different, even, from the use of exaggeration or vilifi-
cation in pressing one's beliefs. As the Court observed in Cantwell v.
Connecticut:
3 4 2
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
mill about, push, shove, or disagree, even violently, with the speaker. Indeed, it is rare where
controversial topics are discussed that an outdoor crowd does not do some or all of these things."
Id. at 325-26 (Blank, J., dissenting).
337. 372 U.S. 229, 233, 238 (1963) (setting aside the breach-of-the-peace convictions of 187
civil rights protesters who were arrested after refusing a police order to disperse their peaceful
demonstration on a sidewalk around the State House grounds). The demonstration produced a
tense crowd of 300 onlookers, reacting to the demonstrators' signs reading "Down with Segrega-
tion," "I Am Proud To Be a Negro," and similar messages. Id. at 231. Notwithstanding the
crowd's reaction, the Court held that a state cannot criminalize "the peaceful expression of un-
popular views." Id. at 237.
338. 379 U.S. 536, 551, 575 (1965) (invoking the overbreadth doctrine in striking down Loui-
siana's breach-of-the-peace statute, which "as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana Su-
preme Court... would allow persons to be punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular
views"). In Cox, the plaintiff was a civil rights activist who led a peaceful march of some 2,000
students to a state courthouse, where they protested the arrest and incarceration of fellow activ-
ists. Id. at 538-40. The protest produced "muttering" and "grumbling" among several white
onlookers. Id. at 543. The demonstration ended in chaos when, after the protesters refused to
disperse, police fired tear gas into the crowd. See id. at 544. In assessing the situation, the Court
found "the 'compelling answer ... [to be] that constitutional rights may not be denied simply
because of hostility to their assertion or exercise."' Id. at 551 (quoting Watson v. City of Mem-
phis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)).
339. 394 U.S. 111, 111-13 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment barred the disorderly
conduct convictions of eighty-five civil rights protesters who remained peaceful, although they
were pelted with rocks and eggs, and were arrested after refusing a police dispersal order
prompted solely by the onlookers' unruliness).
340. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (1951).
341. See id.
342. 310 U.S. 296, 303, 311 (1940) (setting aside the breach-of-the-peace conviction of a Je-
hovah's Witness who, in the course of his sidewalk proselytizing, incensed onlookers by playing a
phonograph record that expressed virulently anti-Catholic sentiments). The Court found that,
because the defendant's conduct was neither truculent nor abusive, he could not be convicted of
breach of the peace based on the hostile reaction of his audience. See id. at 310-11.
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rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point
of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration,
to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation
have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability
of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential
to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens
of a democracy.34 3
The underlying rationale of the hostile audience cases is to pre-
vent a "heckler's veto" of minority opinions. 44 The idea is to give
minority viewpoints a chance to enter the marketplace of ideas and
gain adherents.345 This principle is traceable to James Madison's idea
that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to prevent the tyranny of the
majority.34 6 Although, in operation, the principle is often invoked by
those who espouse racist,347 fascist,348 anti-Semitic, 349 or anti-Catho-
343. Id. at 310.
344. Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir. 1975) (sustaining a section 1983
action brought by a solitary anti-Nixon protester who, while waiting along the route of a presi-
dential motorcade amid a sea of Nixon supporters, inspired a hostile audience reaction that
prompted police to censor her expression). The protester unfurled an anti-Nixon sign prompting
grumbling and muttered threats from onlookers. See id. at 902. The onlookers cheered when, in
the face of the defendant's refusal to remove her sign, a police officer took the sign from her and
tore it up. See id. The court held that to permit the officer's action would "incorporate into [the
First Amendment] a 'heckler's veto' which would empower an audience to cut-off the expression
of a speaker with whom it disagreed. The state may not rely on community hostility and threats
of violence to justify censorship." Id. at 905-06.
345. See, e.g., Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 999-1000, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1965)
(enjoining city officials from prohibiting a parade protesting American military intervention in
Vietnam, even though the plaintiffs' previous peaceful marches were disrupted by angry specta-
tors who hurled tear gas bombs, broke through police cordons, ripped banners, and disabled
loudspeakers). The court rejected the notion that a citizen may be denied the right to speak
based on the likely antagonism that his message may inspire. See id. at 1001. The court observed
that "under such a doctrine, unpopular political groups might be rendered virtually inarticulate."
Id.
346. See 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1029 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1971) (remarks of June 8, 1789, House of Representatives).
347. See, e.g., Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 374, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (issuing a preliminary injunction to allow a
KKK march on the grounds that the "proposed restriction of the location of the Klan's march,
resting as it did on the threat of listeners' violent reaction to the message being delivered, was
content based").
348. See, e.g., Collin v. Chicago Park District, 460 F.2d 746, 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1972) (finding
an ordinance invoked to deny a parade permit to a Nazi group to be "in violation of the First
Amendment insofar as it fails to provide for adequate notice and a prompt final judicial decision
where prior restraint is imposed upon the exercise of the freedom of assembly and freedom of
speech").
349. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (overturning the breach-of-
the-peace conviction of an anti-Semitic speaker for "vigorously, if not viciously, criticiz[ing] vari-
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lic350 sentiments, there'are equally important hostile audience cases
where the unpopular viewpoints receiving protection went on to se-
cure a majority of adherents: namely, the fights for racial equality351
and an end to the Vietnam War.352 Indeed, many ideas that are now
popularly held were once maintained only by a small minority of citi-
zens-including the notions that women should vote and that contra-
ception should not be banned.353
Ultimately, the hostile audience cases permit the following con-
clusions. Terminiello and its progeny make clear that a speaker can-
not be punished for an angry reaction to the speaker's ideas- 354
even, per Cantwell, if he resorts to exaggeration or vilification in
pressing his beliefs. 355 Such protection does not extend to the speaker
who undertakes a mischievous, bad faith effort to instigate violent
clashes among his listeners.356 Though Cantwell suggests that speech
rights may necessarily be suspended in the face of an ongoing and
uncontrollable crowd reaction,357 Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Feiner, that police have a duty to protect the unpopular speaker,358 is a
principle now firmly established in the lower courts.3 5 9
ous political and racial groups whose activities he denounced as inimical to the nation's
welfare").
350. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (overturning the breach-of-
the-peace conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for publicly making anti-Catholic remarks because,
although the speech "unnaturally aroused animosity," the ordinance was not "narrowly drawn to
define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial
interest of the State").
351. See, e.g., Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp.
667, 675 (N.D. I11. 1976) (recognizing that "[t]he threat of a hostile audience cannot be consid-
ered in determining whether a permit shall be granted or in a ruling on a request for an injunc-
tion against a demonstration").
352. See, e.g., Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1005-06 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (issuing
an injunction to allow a Vietnam War protest because, "if denied permission to march under
reasonable conditions and regulations [the plaintiffs and others similarly situated] will suffer
irreparable injury in that they will be denied their constitutional right of free speech, assembly
and petition").
353. See Walker, supra note 233, at 34, 52, 61, 83-85; David M. Rabban, The Free Speech
League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 47, 90-93 (1992).
354. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
355. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
356. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317-18, 320-21 (1951).
357. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308.
358. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 327 (Black, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the officers' duty "was to
protect petitioner's right to talk, even to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to
interfere").
359. See Sabel v. Stynchcombe, 746 F.2d 728, 731 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that the
police "could have taken steps to protect [the protesters] while allowing the demonstration to
continue"); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 906 (6th Cir. 1975) (recognizing the po-
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D. Other Regulatory Flaws: Prior Restraint, Overbreadth,
and Vagueness
This Section corresponds to Question Four in our issue-spotting
checklist, which inquires whether the regulation has characteristics of
overbreadth, vagueness, or prior restraint. We turn first to prior re-
straints, examining the two guises in which they appear: speech-re-
strictive injunctions, and speech licensing systems. We then examine
the related doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.
1. The Two Guises of Prior Restraint: Speech-Restrictive
Injunctions and Licensing Systems
In reaction to the now-vilified press licensing systems of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries,36 ° the doctrine of prior restraint im-
poses severe limits on the power of government to regulate speech
before it is uttered or published.361 Prior restraints come in two
forms: (1) speech-restrictive injunctions,36 and (2) licensing systems
that require a permit or fee as a prerequisite to engaging in expressive
activity.363
There are four basic points to bear in mind with regard to speech-
restrictive injunctions: (1) a flat, pre-publication gag order is presump-
lice officers' duty to "take reasonable action to protect from violence persons exercising their
constitutional rights"); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding
that, "[iun the exercise of his rights under fair and reasonable regulations, the plaintiff is...
entitled to protection by [the] police"); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1951)
(realizing that, "[o]nce charged with the duty of keeping the peace, a police officer cannot be an
innocent bystander where the constitutionally protected rights of persons are being invaded");
Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (imposing on public officials
and police officers the "duty to maintain order by taking such steps as may be reasonably neces-
sary and feasible to protect peaceful, orderly speakers").
360. See generally SEIBERT, supra note 57, at 47-63 (describing the sixteenth and seventeenth
century press licensing system in England).
361. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (holding that
"[a] law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to prior restraint of a license,
without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is
unconstitutional").
362. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (striking down
injunctions barring the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing excerpts from the
"Pentagon Papers," a top-secret Defense Department study of the Vietnam War).
363. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 149-51, 159 (1969) (striking down a parade licensing
scheme that effectively vested unfettered discretion in licensing officials). The licensing authori-
ties "were to be guided only by their own ideas of 'public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency,
good order, morals or convenience."' Id. at 150 (quoting the licensing ordinance). In the face of
such a scheme, the Court held that "a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms
to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority, is unconstitutional." Id. at 150-51.
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tively unconstitutional,364 (2) injunctions that impose time, place, or
manner restrictions are subject to a heightened form of intermediate
scrutiny,365 (3) speech-restrictive injunctions must not be granted ex
parte, and their restraints must be limited to the narrowest possible
scope, 366 and (4) under the "collateral bar" rule, speech-restrictive in-
junctions must be obeyed, even if they are unconstitutional.367
"Any prior restraint on expression [arrives in court] with a 'heavy
presumption' against its constitutional validity,"3 68 and with the bur-
den on the government to prove that such a restriction is justified.369
The Supreme Court has shown special hostility to any injunction that
imposes a flat, pre-publication gag order on protected expression-
striking down such injunctions in Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art,37 ° New York Times Company v. United States,3 7 ' and Near v. Min-
nesota3 72 -because prior restraints on publication violate even the
narrow common law conception of press freedom that prevailed in the
364. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (recognizing that
"[a]ny prior restraint on expression carries.., with it a 'heavy presumption' against its constitu-
tional validity") (citations omitted).
365. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994) (holding that
differences between injunctions and generally applicable ordinances "require a somewhat more
stringent application of general First Amendment principles in [the time, place, and manner]
context").
366. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-84 (1968)
(noting that "[t]here is a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of
temporary restraining orders of short duration; but there is no place within the area of basic
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment for such orders where no showing is made that it
is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to
participate").
367. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1967) (upholding the criminal
contempt convictions of eight black ministers, who defied an arguably unconstitutional injunc-
tion prohibiting a civil rights march, because they were barred from using the injunction's inva-
lidity as a defense to criminal contempt charges for violating the court order); Randy Barnett,
The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 553 (1997).
368. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 558 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 418-20 (1971)); accord New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(quoting Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
369. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 558; New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
370. 427 U.S. 539, 541-44, 570 (1976) (striking down a gag order on press coverage of a
murder trial, where the injunction barred newspapers and broadcasters from reporting any con-
fession by or inculpatory information about the accused).
371. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (striking down injunctions barring the New York Times and
Washington Post from publishing excerpts from the "Pentagon Papers," a top secret Defense
Department study of the Vietnam War).
372. 283 U.S. 697, 701-04, 722-23 (1931) (striking down an injunction perpetually enjoining
the Saturday Press from publishing any "malicious, scandalous, or defamatory" material, where
the paper accused the Minneapolis police chief of corruption).
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eighteenth century.373 In New York Times, the Court struck down in-
junctions that barred both the Times and the Washington Post from
publishing excerpts from the "Pentagon Papers," a top secret Defense
Department study of the Vietnam War.374 Though some of the Jus-
tices expressed concern that lifting the injunctions with the war still
pending would compromise national security,375 the Papers merely
disclosed the history of the war rather than current tactics and troop
movements.376 And the history they revealed was deeply unflattering
to the Executive Branch because it showed that the American public
had been lied to and kept in the dark about the conduct of the war.377
If ever the media did seek to disclose current troop movements
(which, in this day and age, would be instantly available to television
viewers throughout the world on CNN, not to mention the Internet),
the Court likely would uphold a prior restraint.378 The test currently
employed by the Court is to treat pre-publication injunctions as pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, 379 and to entertain even the possibility of
a gag order by weighing the answers to two questions: (1) how great is
the harm posed by the publication?, and (2) how speculative is the
373. In 1769, Sir William Blackstone wrote that "[t]he liberty of the press ... consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publications." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151-52 (1979) (emphasis in original). For a general discussion of the
English press licensing system, see SIEBERT, supra note 57, at 47-63. An awareness of this his-
tory informed the Supreme Court's early cases in the area of prior restraint. See Near, 283 U.S.
at 713-14 (invoking Blackstone and the history of English press licensing in striking down a pre-
publication gag order). Knowledge of the English system also helps to explain why some of the
Justices were so incensed by the Pentagon Papers injunctions. See NEW YORK TIMES CO. v.
UNITED STATES, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (believing that "every mo-
ment's continuance of the injunctions against [the New York Times and Washington Post]
amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment").
374. New Yorks Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
375. See id. at 762-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
376. See United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 991-94 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(distinguishing the Pentagon Papers case issuing an injunction barring a magazine from publish-
ing information about how to construct a hydrogen bomb, in part, because the information
sought to be published in New York Times was "historical data relating to events that occurred
some three to twenty years previously").
377. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1167 (3d ed. 1996).
378. But this has been the law, it seems, since Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), where
the Court observed that no one "would question but that the government might prevent.., the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Id. at 716.
Even the Pentagon Papers concurrence of Justice Brennan concedes as much-though Brennan
envinces a willingness only to enjoin little else: "[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that
publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred
to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim
restraining order." New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
379. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976).
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proof of that harm.380 An extremely rare381 example of a court grant-
ing a pre-publication injunction is United States v. The Progressive,
Incorporated,382 where a federal district court barred the publication
of a magazine article offering detailed instructions on how to con-
struct a hydrogen bomb. 383 Finding "no plausible reason why the pub-
lic needs to know the technical details about hydrogen bomb
construction to carry on an informed debate on this issue, 384 and
stressing that it was dealing with "the most destructive weapon in the
history of mankind, '385 the court reluctantly concluded that an injunc-
tion was warranted.386 The court reasoned that "[a] mistake in ruling
against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear anni-
hilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and
the right to publish becomes moot. 38 7
Injunctions that impose content-neutral time, place, or manner
restrictions are subject to a heightened form of intermediate scru-
tiny388 -under a test that is slightly more stringent than that for legis-
lation.389 Observing that "[i]njunctions . ..carry greater risks of
censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordi-
nances," the Supreme Court held in 1994 that appellate courts should
subject speech-restrictive injunctions to more "stringent" First
Amendment scrutiny than comparable legislation.3 1 "Accordingly,
when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we think that our stan-
dard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous."'39 1
Announcing a new standard of review for content-neutral injunctions,
the Court held that, rather than inquiring whether the order is nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, "[w]e must
380. See id. at 562 (adopting the Learned Hand test that examines whether "'the gravity of
the 'evil' [posed by publication], discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger"') (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(2d Cir. 1950)).
381. The author's research uncovered no other example.
382. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
383. Id. at 991, 1000 (granting a preliminary injunction against a magazine seeking to dis-
credit the government's system of classification and secrecy by publishing an article revealing
that much of the information necessary for constructing a hydrogen bomb was already contained
in publicly available literature). For an excellent discussion of the Progressive case, see STONE,
supra note 386, at 1169-71.
384. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 994.
385. Id. at 995.
386. See id.
387. Id. at 996.
388. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994).
389. See id. at 764-65.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 765.
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 273 1999-2000
SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ask instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction bur-
den no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest. 392
Speech-restrictive injunctions must not be issued ex parte and
their restraints must be limited to the narrowest possible scope.393
These twin teachings were emphatically delivered in Carroll v. Presi-
dent & Commissioners of Princess Anne,3 94 where the Supreme Court
struck down a ten-day injunction, issued ex parte, that banned further
demonstrations by a white supremacist group.395 The Court found
that ex parte speech injunctions are presumptively unconstitutional;
this is because, by definition, their issuance takes place without the
crucial benefit of evidentiary input from both sides of the dispute.396
Thus, the procedural safeguards necessary for sustaining a prior re-
straint are entirely lacking.397 The Carroll injunction offended the
First Amendment not only for its ex parte issuance,398 but also for its
broad scope by enjoining a group from holding meetings or rallies an-
ywhere in the county "which will tend to disturb and endanger" the
local citizenry.399 The Court stressed that speech-restrictive injunc-
tions "must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish
the pinpointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the
essential needs of public order. ' '400
Under the "collateral bar" rule, speech-restrictive injunctions
must be obeyed, even if they are unconstitutional. 40 1 By engaging in
expressive activity in defiance of such an injunction, a speaker places
herself in contempt of court-and, under the collateral bar rule,4°2 the
injunction's unconstitutionality is no defense to a contempt citation.4 °3
An example of this is Walker v. City of Birmingham, °4 where the Su-
preme Court upheld the criminal contempt convictions of eight black
392. Id. (emphasis added).
393. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-84 (1968).
394. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
395. Id. at 180-81.
396. See id. at 183.
397. See id. at 181.
398. Id. at 180-81.
399. Id. at 177.
400. Id. at 184.
401. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386
(1980) (discussing the "established doctrine that persons subject to an injunctive order issued by
a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if
they have proper grounds to object to the order").
402. See id.
403. See id.; Barnett, supra note 367, at 553.
404. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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ministers who defied a temporary restraining order requiring them to
secure a permit before conducting a civil rights march.40 5 Though the
Court acknowledged that the injunction might well have been consti-
tutionally suspect,40 6 it refused to reach that issue, holding40 7 that the
ministers, while free to challenge the injunction in court, were not free
to defy it.4°8 One unfortunate effect of the collateral bar rule is that
prospective speakers, confronted by an unconstitutional injunction,
can be silenced for months while they pursue the path of judicial
review.
Of the two basic forms of prior restraint, speech-restrictive in-
junctions are one type, while speech-restrictive licensing schemes are
the other. Let us turn from our review of injunctions to an examina-
tion of speech licensing schemes. Such licensing schemes will run
afoul of the First Amendment if they fail to limit: (1) the licensor's
discretion in issuing a permit or fee, or (2) the time frame for issuing a
license.40 9 In FW/PBS, Incorporated v. City of Dallas,41° the Supreme
Court identified the "two evils" of speech licensing schemes "that will
not be tolerated" 41 -vesting "unbridled discretion" in the licensing
authority,412 and "fail[ing] to place limits on the time frame within
which the decisionmaker must issue the license. ' 413 Let us examine
these "two evils" in turn.
Courts have consistently invalidated permit schemes vesting gov-
ernment officials with unfettered discretion to forbid or allow certain
speech activities 414 -striking down discretionary limits on parades,
415
405. Id. at 315-17.
406. See id. at 316-19.
407. See id. at 319.
408. See id. at 319-20.
409. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990).
410. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
411. Id. at 225-27.
412. Id. at 225-26.
413. Id. at 226.
414. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988) (address-
ing a scheme requiring a permit to place newsracks on public property and holding that, "when a
licensing statute allegedly vests unbridled discretion in a government official over whether to
permit or deny expressive activity, one who is subject to the law may challenge it facially without
the necessity of first applying for, and being denied, a license"); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547, 551-53 (1975) (addressing a permit to use a city auditorium and
enjoining city from preventing the performance of "Hair," observing that "the danger of censor-
ship and abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have
unbridled discretion over a forum's use").
415. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (striking down a
parade licensing scheme because "a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to
2000]
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demonstrations,416 sidewalk preaching,417 leafleting,4"8 rallies in public
parks,4 19 and the. use of sound amplification equipment.420  Any
scheme that vests arbitrary discretion in the licensing official "has the
potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of
view. '  Accordingly, a permit scheme will survive constitutional
scrutiny only if it employs content-neutral criteria, and only if it con-
tains "narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards for the [li-
censing] officials to follow." '422 Without such standards, "post hoc
rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or ille-
gitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to deter-
mine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting
favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression. "423
Closely akin to these "unfettered discretion" cases are those in
which the permit scheme allows licensing officials to consider either
the controversial nature of a speaker's message or its potential for
inspiring a hostile response.424 These schemes are struck down just as
readily-and for the same reason-as schemes affording unbridled
discretion. In both contexts, the First Amendment flaw is the same:
the right to speak is left to hinge on the popularity of the speaker's
the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority, is unconstitutional").
416. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939) (striking down a licensing scheme affect-
ing peaceful demonstrations because "it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble ... is a
privilege inherent in the citizenship of the United States which the [First] Amendment
protects").
417. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 290-93 (1951) (striking down a statute proscribing
public worship meetings on public sidewalks, streets, and parks as an invalid prior restraint on
speech because "'streets and parks ... [are] held in trust for the use of the public and [are] used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions"') (quoting Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
418. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 157, 165 (1939) (striking down an ordinance
requiring prior written permission for canvassing and distributing unsolicited material, and pro-
scribing punishment for "acting without a permit").
419. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72 (1951) (striking down a licensing
scheme "prohibiting or regulating the use of [a] park without a permit, whereby all authority to
grant permits for use of the park is in the Park Commissioner and the City Council").
420. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 (1948) (striking down an ordinance requiring "a
permit from the Chief of Police ... [to] use a loud-speaker or amplifier," characterizing it as
without standards "for the exercise of... discretion ... [and] not narrowly drawn to regulate").
421. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981).
422. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 271.
423. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1989).
424. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 132-35 (1992) (recog-
nizing that "[n]othing in the [subject] law or its application prevents [an] official from encourag-
ing some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary application of fees" before
allowing a potentially disruptive speaker to use a public forum).
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message. The permit schemes in this line of precedent are of two
(equally fatal) types: (1) those allowing the licensor to forbid or re-
strict speech activities based on concerns that the speaker's message
will inspire a hostile response,425 and (2) those allowing the licensor to
charge a higher police protection fee based on the anticipated level of
hostility among onlookers.426
Courts will treat as "a species of unbridled discretion" any failure
by a licensing scheme to place limits on the time frame for issuing a
permit.427 A licensing scheme may run afoul of this requirement in
one of two ways: (1) by failing to afford prompt processing of permit
applications or prompt judicial review of permit denials,42 8 or (2) by
imposing advance registration requirements that build into the appli-
cation process a lengthy delay before the licensee may speak.42 9
425. See, e.g., Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 366 N.E.2d 347, 352-
53 (Ill. 1977) (declining to enjoin a Nazi group from marching through an Illinois suburb popu-
lated by hundreds of Holocaust survivors on the grounds that "[t]he threat of a hostile audience
cannot be considered in determining whether a permit shall be granted or in a ruling on a re-
quest for an injunction against a demonstration"); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109-10
(M.D. Ala. 1965) (ordering Alabama officials to permit Martin Luther King, Jr.'s march from
Selma to Montgomery by noting that the "defendants' contention that there is some hostility to
[the] march will not justify its denial").
426. See, e.g., Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134 (striking down a permit scheme under which
"those wishing to express views unpopular with bottle throwers ... may have to pay more for
their permit"). The Court was clear in asserting that "[s]peech cannot be financially burdened,
anymore than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob." Id.
at 134-35.
427. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1990).
428. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (striking down a Maryland
statute regarding motion picture censorship as an invalid prior restraint because the statute's
procedural safeguards were inadequate). In FW/PBS, the Court distilled the procedural safe-
guards required in Freedman in the following manner:
(1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period
during which the status quo must be maintained; (2) expeditious judicial review of that
decision must be available; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to
suppress the speech and must bear the burden of proof once in court.
FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965)).
429. See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1357-58 (9th Cir.' 1984) (rejecting
an ordinance thwarting plans for an immediate protest with a twenty-day advance registration
requirement). The court invalidated the ordinance because it effectively "outlaw[ed] spontane-
ous expression." Id. at 1355. The court stressed that "simple delay may permanently vitiate the
expressive content of a demonstration. A spontaneous parade expressing a viewpoint on a topi-
cal issue will almost inevitably attract more participants and more press attention, and generate
more emotion, than the 'same' parade 20 days later. The later parade can never be the same.
Where spontaneity is part of the message, dissemination delayed is dissemination denied." Id. at
1356.
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2. Overbreadth and Vagueness
In common with prior restraint, the doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness are united by one common feature: each is concerned with
an impermissible method of regulating speech.43 ° These doctrines fo-
cus not on the content of speech, but on the regulatory means em-
ployed by the government in restricting it.431  The overbreadth
doctrine may be invoked to strike down restrictions on speech that are
worded in such a way that even protected expression is left vulnerable
to punishment.432 The vagueness doctrine may be invoked to strike
down restrictions on speech that are worded in such a way that citi-
zens cannot reasonably discern what is prohibited.433
An excellent example of the overbreadth doctrine is Board of
Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus,4 34 where the
Supreme Court struck down, on overbreadth grounds, a regulation
prohibiting any person "to engage in First Amendment activities
within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Air-
port. ' '4 35  This regulation was fatally overbroad, held the Court, be-
cause "it prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing of
campaign buttons or symbolic clothing. 436
There are two justifications for the overbreadth doctrine: (1) con-
cerns about the chilling effect of overbroad prohibitions on speech,4 37
430. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1992).
431. See id.
432. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down, as facially overbroad, pro-
visions of the Communications Decency Act, a federal statute that criminalized the Internet
transmission of "indecent" materials to persons under the age of eighteen, and stressing that
"[i]n order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the [Act] effectively suppresses
a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one
another"); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1987) (striking down, as facially over-
broad, an ordinance prohibiting speech that "in any manner" interrupts a police officer in per-
forming his duties). The Court observed that the ordinance was so broadly worded that it was
violated every day and effectively gave police unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for
words or conduct that merely annoyed or offended them. See id. at 461-63.
433. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568-69, 578 (1974) (sustaining a vagueness challenge
to a Massachusetts statute that criminalized publicly treating the American flag "contemptu-
ously"). The Court observed that any "unceremonial" use of the flag may be regarded by some
as "contemptuous," but casual treatment of the flag as "an object of youth fashion and high
camp" is commonplace. Id. at 573-74. Given the prevalence of these widely divergent views, a
statute criminalizing the "contemptuous" use of the flag was so vague that police, courts, and
juries were free to enforce it under their own preferences for treatment of the flag. See id. at
574-75.
434. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
435. Id. at 574-75.
436. Id. at 575.
437. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
800-01 (1984).
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and (2) a recognition that the broader the statute, the broader will be
the discretion enjoyed by government officials to engage in selective
enforcement.438 Much of the overbreadth doctrine's complexity de-
rives from its procedural aspects. The overbreadth doctrine: (1) per-
mits facial rather than as-applied challenges,439 (2) relaxes the normal
rules governing who may bring a constitutional challenge,"' (3) is lim-
ited by the power of a court to save an overbroad statute through a
"narrowing construction,""' and (4) is limited by the requirement of
"substantial" overbreadth.442  Let us examine these procedural as-
pects in the foregoing order.
The doctrine authorizes a facial challenge to an overbroad statute
that, if successful, results in the statute's total invalidation.443 This is
very different, and far more devastating, than the result of an as-ap-
plied challenge. A successful facial challenge effectively wipes the of-
fending statute out of the code books, barring its enforcement in all
circumstances. 444 But a successful as-applied challenge leaves the stat-
ute in effect, barring its enforcement only in a certain manner or
under certain circumstances.445 Thus, when a speech restriction is de-
clared facially overbroad, its enforcement by the government in any
context is impermissible.446
The overbreadth doctrine authorizes a relaxation of normal
standing requirements by allowing a judge to consider the effect of a
challenged regulation on third parties not presently before the
court.4 47 In this regard, the Supreme Court:
has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit-in the First
Amendment area-"attacks on overly broad statutes with no re-
quirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own [speech] could not be [punished if the] statute [were] drawn
with the requisite narrow specificity." Litigants, therefore, are per-
mitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free
438. See Saia v. New York, 344 U.S. 558, 560-62 (1948).
439. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796.
440. See id. at 796-98.
441. Id. at 800 n.19.
442. Id. at 799-800.
443. See id. at 797-98.
444. See id. at 769-97.
445. See id.
446. See id. Under the First Amendment, overbreadth is not the only basis on which to
assert a facial challenge. "There are two quite different ways in which a statute or ordinance
may be considered invalid 'on its face'-eithet because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable
application, or because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected [expression] that it is
unconstitutionally 'overbroad."' Id. at 796.
447. See id. at 796-98; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
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expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or as-
sumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression.
448
Gooding v. Wilson4 49 is a vivid example of the extent to which the
normal rules of standing are relaxed in overbreadth challenges. It
shows why the Supreme Court considers the overbreath doctrine to be
"strong medicine."45 In Gooding, the Court sustained an over-
breadth challenge to a Georgia statute that criminalized a spectrum of
statements far broader than fighting words (reaching "opprobrious
words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the
peace") 451-but it did so in a case where the person challenging the
statute likely had uttered fighting words.452 Gooding stemmed from a
clash between police officers and anti-war demonstrators at an army
induction center.453 When police officers attempted to move the de-
fendant away from the facility's entrance, a scuffle ensued in which he
said to the officers: "You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death!" and
"White son of a bitch, I'll kill you!" and "You son of a bitch, if you
ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces! ' 45 4 Since
these words likely fall within the definition of fighting words, it would
have been constitutionally permissible to punish this defendant under
an appropriately narrow statute.455 But the Georgia statute was not
appropriately narrow4 56 -and because it swept so far beyond the
scope of fighting words, it was vulnerable to an overbreadth
challenge.457
What Goodin shows is that standing to assert such a challenge is
available even to someone who did not engage in constitutionally pro-
tected speech and who could not have escaped conviction under an
appropriately narrow statute.458 And what is the reason for these re-
laxed standing rules? "[They are] deemed necessary," observed Jus-
tice Brennan, "because persons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of
448. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
449. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
450. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 122 (1990); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
451. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519.
452. Id. at 519-20 n.1
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. See id. at 521
456. See id.
457. See id.
458. Id.
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criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to
protected expression. 459
The overbreadth doctrine is limited by the power of courts to
save an overbroad statute through the issuance of a "narrowing con-
struction. '460 Such a construction effectively rewrites the statute, de-
claring its scope to be more limited than its sweeping language would
suggest, and identifying the constricted range of circumstances to
which it may henceforth be applied.46 The Supreme Court has cau-
tioned against the wholesale use of this approach, observing that a
narrowing construction should be employed "only if it is 'readily sus-
ceptible' to such a construction. '462 The appropriate source of a nar-
rowing construction depends on the statute's origin: federal courts are
free to narrow federal statutes,463 but state legislation should be nar-
rowed by courts of that state.464 When, in Gooding, the Supreme
Court invoked the overbreadth doctrine to strike down Georgia's
"abusive language" statute, it observed that the Georgia courts failed
to issue the sort of narrowing construction that might have saved the
statute.465
In 1973, one year after deciding Gooding, the Supreme Court fur-
ther limited the doctrine's availability by imposing the requirement of
"substantial" overbreadth.466 What is meant by "substantial" over-
breadth is less than clear. Straining to elaborate the Court has
observed:
The concept of "substantial overbreadth" is not readily reduced to
an exact definition. It is clear, however, that the mere fact that one
can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not
sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. On
459. Id. (emphasis added).
460. Virginia v. American Bookseller's Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (recognizing the
"tenet of First Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a statute, if it be 'readily
susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld").
461. See id.
462. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997) (quoting Virginia v. American Bookseller's
Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)).
463. See id. (recognizing the Court's ability to "construe a statute narrowly because the text
or other source of Congressional intent identif[ies] a clear line that [the] Court [can] draw").
464. See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520 (recognizing that the Court "lack[s] jurisdiction authorita-
tively to construe state legislation"); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)
(holding that "a state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject
to a narrowing construction by the state courts").
465. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524.
466. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973) (holding that "the overbreadth of a
statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep").
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the contrary,... there must be a realistic danger that the statute
itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment
protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially chal-
lenged on overbreadth grounds. 467
An example of how the Court applies the requirement of "sub-
stantial" overbreadth is New York v. Ferber,468 where the Court re-
jected an overbreadth challenge to a statute that prohibited persons
from knowingly promoting a sexual performance by a child under the
age of sixteen.469 While recognizing that the statute might reach some
forms of protected expression (like medical textbooks or pictorials in
National Geographic),47° the Court observed: "We seriously doubt ...
that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute ...
amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the stat-
ute's reach. '471 Thus, a statute will be deemed unconstitutionally
overbroad only when a substantial number of its potential applications
entail protected expression.472
Turning from overbreadth to vagueness, a speech regulation is
void for vagueness unless it gives a "person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. 473 In Grayned v. City of Rockford,47 4 the Supreme
Court identified three distinct policy grounds for striking down vague
laws: (1) vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warn-
ing of what is proscribed,475 (2) vague laws "impermissibly delegate
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on
an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application, ' 476 and (3) when directed at expres-
sive activity, vague laws may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. Indeed, vagueness can have the same effect as overbreadth,
467. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
800-01 (1984).
468. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
469. See id. at 750-51.
470. See id. at 773.
471. Id.
472. See id. at 771 (finding substantial overbreadth only where the statute "reaches a sub-
stantial number of impermissible applications"); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1984)
(recognizing that "an overbreadth challenge can be raised on behalf of others only when ... the
statute is unconstitutional in a substantial portion of the cases to which it applies").
473. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
474. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
475. Id. at 108.
476. Id. at 108-09.
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prompting citizens to steer a wide path around the perceived
prohibition.477
In Smith v. Goguen,478 the Court sustained a vagueness challenge
to a Massachusetts statute that criminalized publicly treating the
American flag "contemptuously. ' 479 The Court observed that any
"unceremonial" use of the flag might be regarded by some as "con-
temptuous," but that casual treatment of the flag as "an object of
youth fashion and high camp" had become commonplace. 480 Given
the prevalence of such widely divergent views, a statute criminalizing
the "contemptuous" use of the flag was so vague that police, courts,
and juries were free to enforce it under their own preferences.481 Ac-
cordingly, the Court ruled it void for vagueness.
In contrast to an overbreadth challenge, where the statute must
be shown to reach a substantial number of impermissible applica-
tions,482 a vagueness challenge will fail unless the statute is shown to
be "impermissibly vague in all of its applications., 483 Also in contrast
to the overbreadth doctrine, vagueness challenges do not enjoy the
same relaxed rules on standing.484
E. Special Rules for Special Settings
This Section corresponds to Question Five in our issue-spotting
checklist, which inquires whether a speech regulation pertains to one
of the settings for which the Supreme Court has created special rules.
We will address, in turn: (1) the particularized rules governing speech
on public property, (2) the Court's "medium-specific" approach to
communications media (broadcasting, cable television, and the In-
ternet), (3) the lesser protection afforded speech in "restricted" envi-
ronments (schools, prisons, and the military), (4) the limited speech
rights of public employees, and (5) the Court's special deference to
restrictions on government-funded expression.
477. Id. at 109.
478. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
479. Id. at 568-69, 572.
480. Id. at 573-74.
481. See id. at 574-75.
482. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1892) (emphasis added).
483. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)
(emphasis added).
484. See id. at 508 (White, J., concurring) (recognizing that, unlike vagueness, "overbreadth
is a standing doctrine that permits parties in cases involving First Amendment challenges to
government restrictions on noncommercial speech to argue that the regulation is invalid because
of its effect on the First Amendment rights of others not presently before the Court").
2000]
HeinOnline  -- 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 283 1999-2000
SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1. Speech on Public Property
Though this Section is largely devoted to the public forum doc-
trine, it also briefly addresses the Supreme Court's newly-minted ap-
proach to injunctive restrictions on public forum access and
expression.
a. The Public Forum Doctrine
Access to public property for speech-related activities is governed
by the public forum doctrine. 85 The doctrine's fountainhead is Hague
v. CIO, 86 where Justice Roberts, finding a constitutional right to use
"streets and parks for communication of views," '487 based that right on
the fact that streets and parks "have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. '
488
But the right to engage in public protest has never entailed free
access to all types of government property.489 The government, no
less than a private property owner, "'has [the] power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedi-
cated.' ' ' 49° Nothing in the Constitution "requires the Government
freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free
speech on every type of Government property without regard to the
nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the
speaker's activities. ' 491 The First Amendment has never meant that
485. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (recog-
nizing that "[t]he right to use government property for one's private expression depends upon
whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum, or rather
has been reserved for specific official uses").
486. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
487. Id. at 515-16. The Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited the distribution of
printed material in public areas, stating that an ordinance "absolutely prohibiting ... the distri-
bution of circulars, handbills, and placards" is unconstitutional. Id. at 518.
488. Id. at 515.
489. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 (conditioning the use of "government property for one's
private expression [on] whether the property has by law or tradition been given the status of a
public forum"); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-800
(1985) (recognizing that "[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at
all times" and that "nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access
to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property
without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the
speaker's activities") (citation omitted).
490. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47
(1966)).
491. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800.
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people who want to engage in public protest have a "'constitutional
right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please."' 492
In light of these principles, the Court has adopted a "forum-
based" approach to assessing restrictions that the government seeks to
place on the expressive use of its property.493 Government-owned
property is divided into three categories for purposes of forum analy-
sis: (1) "traditional" public fora, (2) "designated" public fora, and (3)
"nonpublic" fora, the last category comprising all of government
property not embraced within the first two.49 4 Traditional public fora
are places that "by long tradition or by government fiat, have been
devoted to assembly and debate" 4 95-including, for example, public
streets, parks, sidewalks,49 6 and the curtilage of legislative seats.49 7
Designated public fora are places that the government "has opened
for expressive activity by part or all of the public"498-including, for
example, university meeting facilities499 and municipal theaters.50 0
Nonpublic fora are places that by tradition, nature, or design "are not
appropriate platforms for unrestrained communication" 50 -includ-
ing, for example, military installations," 2 federal workplaces, 50 3 utility
492. Greer, 424 U.S. at 836 (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)).
493. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)
(recognizing the implicit and explicit precedential acceptance of a "'forum based' approach for
assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property") (citations
omitted).
494. See id. at 678-79.
495. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
496. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (finding that "[p]ublic streets and parks fall into [the]
category [of traditional public fora]").
497. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (finding
"Capitol Square [to be] a traditional public forum").
498. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678.
499. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981) (finding that "through its policy of
accommodating their meetings, the University [of Missouri at Kansas City] has created a forum
generally open for use by student groups").
500. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420- U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (recognizing
municipal theaters as "public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities").
501. Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991).
502. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (finding that "[m]ilitary bases
are generally not public fora").
503. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 810 (1985)
(holding that "the exclusion of respondents may reasonably be considered a means of 'insuring
peace' in the federal workplace").
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poles,5" residential letterboxes, °5 an interschool mail system,5 °6 and a
workplace charity drive aimed at government employees. 07
In forum analysis, the government's power to impose speech re-
strictions depends on how the affected property is categorized.5 °8 The
level of judicial scrutiny hinges on whether the property is deemed a
traditional, designated, or nonpublic forum.5"9
Traditional public fora may be regulated only via content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions.510 Consistent with Track Two
scrutiny, such restrictions: (1) must be "justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech," (2) must be "narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest," and (3) must "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion." '511 Government restrictions on the content of public forum
speech are presumptively unconstitutional,512 and consistent with
Track One scrutiny, they will be struck down unless shown to be "nec-
essary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest. 513
These same standards govern the second category-restrictions
on speech in designated public fora.51 4 Though the government may
limit access to certain speakers (e.g., student groups5 15) or certain sub-
504. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
793 (1984) (finding that "the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as
utility poles for purposes of... communication [is not] comparable to that recognized for public
streets and parks").
505. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 128
(1981) (finding that "a letterbox, once designated an 'authorized depository,' does not at the
same time undergo a transformation into a 'public forum"').
506. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
507. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 790, 797.
508. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992) (enumerating the three categories of forum classification).
509. See id.
510. See Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991).
511. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 788-91 (1989).
512. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
513. Capitol Square Advisory Bd. V. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).
514. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992)
(noting that a "designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character, [is] prop-
erty that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public"); Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 800 (recognizing that, "when the Government has intentionally designated a place or
means of communication as a public forum, speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling
governmental purpose").
515. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (refusing to hold "that a cam-
pus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and non-students, or that a univer-
sity must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings").
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jects (e.g., school board business516), and though it need not keep a
designated public forum open indefinitely,517 its restrictions must be
applied evenhandedly to all similarly situated parties.518
Judicial scrutiny is substantially relaxed, however, vis-a-vis the
third category-restrictions on speech in nonpublic fora.519 Here, the
government enjoys "maximum control over communicative behavior"
because its role is "most analogous to that of a private owner. '520 The
"challenged regulation need only be reasonable, so long as the regula-
tion is not an effort to suppress expression merely because public offi-
cials oppose the speaker's view." '521 Indeed, control over access to a
nonpublic forum may be based on subject matter or speaker identity,
"'so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.' ,522 Ultimately,
the government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum
"'need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation.' ",523
In distinguishing among these categories, the Supreme Court ad-
vanced narrow definitions of both traditional and designated public
fora.52 4 "Traditional public fora are those places which 'by long tradi-
tion or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and de-
bate' "52 5-whose "principal purpose . . . is the free exchange of
ideas."526 Designated public fora are likewise narrowly conceived.52 7
516. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (1976) (finding that "[p]lainly public bodies may confine their
meetings to specified subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business").
517. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
518. See id. at 45-46 n.7.
519. See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678-79.
520. Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991).
521. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 679; accord United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
730 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985);
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
522. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
523. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)) (emphasis in original). But see Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1987) (striking down, as overbroad, a resolution banning all
"First Amendment activities" in an airport terminal). The Court noted that, even if the terminal
was deemed a nonpublic forum, the sweeping ban on expressive activity was facially invalid
"because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of
speech." Id. at 575.
524. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800-02.
525. Id. at 802 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
526. Id. at 800.
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The government does not create a designated public forum "by inac-
tion," '528 or by allowing the public "'freely to visit,' "529 or by "permit-
ting limited discourse" there.53° Instead, a designated public forum is
created only where the government "intentionally open[s] a nontradi-
tional forum for public discourse. ''31 Under these definitions, public
forum status has eluded such heavily frequented public spaces as air-
port terminals,532 state fairgrounds,533 post office sidewalks,534 and
public housing complexes.535
In divining the requisite intent to create a designated public fo-
rum, the Court looks to the government's "policy and practice" vis-a-
vis the property.536 The Court likewise inquires whether the property
is, by nature, "compatib[le] with expressive activity. ' 537 As the Court
observed in Cornelius, "[w]e will not find that a public forum has been
created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will we
527. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 506 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992) (recognizing that "a designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character,
[is] property that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public").
528. Id. at 680; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
529. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836
(1976)).
530. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
531. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680; see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
730 (1990) (stressing that a designated public forum is not created unless it is "expressly dedi-
cated" by the government to "expressive activity"). It does not suffice that the government
acquiesced in even a longstanding pattern of leafletting, speaking, and picketing on the premises.
See id. "A practice of allowing some speech activities on [the] property do[es] not add up to the
dedication of [that] property to speech activities." Id.
532. See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680, 685 (finding an ordinance banning solicita-
tion in an airport terminal to be reasonable because "the tradition of airport activity does not
demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity ...[and
legal] precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport terminals are public fora").
533. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651
(1981) (upholding a rule requiring state fair vendors to be licensed to sell or distribute printed
material and to use designated booths rather than roaming at large on the fairgrounds because,
although a state fair "is a limited public forum in that it exists to provide a means for a greater
number of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views, be they commercial, relig-
ious, or political, to a large number of people in an efficient fashion," the rule provides "organi-
zations with an adequate means to sell and solicit on the fairgrounds").
534. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (finding that a "postal sidewalk was constructed solely to
provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business, [thus] the sidewalk leading to
the entry of [a] post office is not [a] traditional public forum sidewalk").
535. See Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that the "official
mission of the Housing Authority is to provide safe housing for its residents, not to supply non-
residents with a place to disseminate ideas," and that because access "is carefully limited to
lawful residents, their invited guests, and those conducting official business, [there is] little diffi-
culty in concluding that the property is a nonpublic forum").
536. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
537. Id. at 802.
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infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the
nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity." '538
b. Injunctive Restrictions on Public Forum Access
and Expression
Injunctions that impose content-neutral time, place, or manner
restrictions are subject to a heightened form of intermediate scru-
tiny-under a test that is slightly more stringent than that for legisla-
tion.539 Observing that "[i]njunctions . . . carry greater risks of
censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordi-
nances,"54 the Court held in 1994 that speech-restrictive injunctions
should be subjected to more "stringent" First Amendment scrutiny
than comparable legislation.541 The Court noted that, "when evaluat-
ing a content-neutral injunction, we think that our standard time,
place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous. "542 Announc-
ing a new standard of review for content-neutral injunctions, the
Court held that, rather than inquiring whether the order is narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, "[w]e must ask in-
stead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest. '543
2. Communications Media: Broadcasting, Cable Television,
and Cyberspace
In its treatment of mass communications media, the Supreme
Court has adopted a "medium-specific" analysis. 54 The cases featur-
ing broadcast,545 cable television,546 and Internet547 regulation of inde-
538. Id. at 803.
539. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 735, 764-65 (1994).
540. Id. at 764.
541. See id. at 764-65.
542. Id. at 765.
543. Id.
544. ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (discussing the "medium specific " approach
used by the Court).
545. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding the FCC's authority to
sanction a radio station for broadcasting indecent speech during daytime hours when children
were likely to be listening). The program was a daytime broadcast of George Carlin's "filthy
words" monologue, where the comedian repeatedly spoke the seven words "that you definitely
wouldn't say, ever" on the air. Id. at 751. The words were "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits." Id.
546. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 733 (1996)
(upholding one and striking down two other statutory provisions governing indecent, sex-related
programming on cable television). The first provision allowed cable system operators to decide
2000]
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cency, for example, make clear that judicial scrutiny will vary
depending upon the medium of expression. The Court is most defer-
ential to restrictions on broadcasters 548 and least deferential to restric-
tions on the print media.549 In justifying this divergent treatment, the
Court has stressed the unique pervasiveness and intrusiveness of
broadcasting, 550 and the inherent scarcity of its transmission frequen-
cies. 1  When confronted with new forms of communication-such as
"dial-a-porn," 552 cable television,553 and the unsolicited mailing of
whether to broadcast "patently offensive" material on leased access channels. Id. The Court
held that the provision was consistent with a balancing of government objectives and First
Amendment freedoms. See id. at 744-45. But the second provision required leased channel
operators to segregate and block "offensive programming," while the third provision permitted
discretion in broadcasting such material on "public, educational, and government channels." Id.
at 732-33. The Court struck down the second and third provisions because "they [were] not
appropriately tailored to achieve the basic, legitimate objective of protecting children from expo-
sure to 'patently offensive' material." Id. As such, the four-Justice plurality decision leaves
open the possibility that a lesser First Amendment standard may be applied to cable television in
future cases. See id. at 737-38.
547. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 849 (striking down two statutory provisions banning "indecent"
and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet). The Court identified certain fac-
tors-the extensive history of government regulation of braodcasters, the "scarcity of available
frequencies," and the "invasive" nature of the medium-as justifying the heightened regulation
of broadcasting. Id. at 868. These justifications do not apply to the Internet. See id. Thus, the
Court found that there is no basis on which to qualify the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to content-based restrictions on Internet speech. See id. at 868-69. As such,
speech in cyberspace enjoys the same enhanced protection as that reserved for books and news-
papers. See id.
548. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (noting that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcast-
ing that has received the most limited First Amendment protection"); Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969) (finding that, "[a]lthough broadcasting is clearly a medium
affected by a First Amendment interest, differences in the characteristics of new media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them") (citation omitted).
549. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that "[t]he
choice of material to go into a newspaper .... whether fair or unfair, constitute[s] the exercise of
editorial control and judgment, [and] it has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of free press
as they have evolved to this time").
550. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50 (recognizing that "the broadcast media have established
a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and "[p]atently offensive, indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts citizens, not only in public, but also in the privacy
of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder").
551. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90 (recognizing that "[w]here there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual
to speak, write, or publish").
552. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1989) (finding
that "the dial-it medium requires the listener to take the affirmative steps to receive the commu-
nication, [and] unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one
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contraceptives 554-the Court has struggled to analogize them either to
print or broadcast media. Though the Court recently ruled that In-
ternet communications are entitled to the same unqualified protection
reseved for the print media,555 it has balked at doing the same for
cable television.556
3. Restricted Environments: Schools, Prisons, and the Military
This Section addresses the diminished speech protections that
prevail in schools, prisons, and the military.
a. Schools
Two decisions-separated by a gulf of twenty years and mutually
antithetical-govern the landscape of student speech.557  The older,
waning authority is Tinker v. Des Moines School District,55 8 while the
newer, waxing authority is Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.559
In Tinker, several high school and junior high school students
were suspended for wearing black armbands as a symbol of opposition
to the Vietnam War.560 Two days before, and in anticipation of the
who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an
unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it").
553. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (leaving open "the question of the proper standard for judging First
Amendment challenges to a municipality's restriction of access to cable facilities," and recogniz-
ing the lack of factual data regarding the nature of cable television upon which to adjudge
whether it is "sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an already
existing standard or whether those characteristics [of cable television] require a new analysis").
554. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (recognizing that "[tihe
receipt of mail is far less intrusive and uncontrollable [than the broadcast media]," and that "the
special interest of the Federal Government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily
translate into a justification for regulation of other means of communication") (citations
omitted).
555. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 868, 870 (1997) (agreeing that "the content on the Internet
is as diverse as human thought," and therefore there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [that] medium").
556. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 747 (1996)
(plurality opinion leaving open the possibility that a lesser First Amendment standard may be
applied to cable television in future cases). Justice Thomas's concurring opinion recognized that
"First Amendment distinctions between media, dubious from their infancy, placed cable in a
doctrinal wasteland in which regulators and cable operators alike could not be sure whether
cable was entitled to the substantial First Amendment protections afforded the print media or
was subject to the more onerous obligations shouldered by the broadcast media." Id. at 813-14
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
557. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
558. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
559. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
560. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
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protest, school officials adopted a rule forbidding the wearing of such
armbands. 61 The Supreme Court held that the prohibition against
armbands violated the students' First Amendment rights because
school officials were regulating expressive conduct that approached
the level of "pure, speech. '56 2 In arriving at this result, the Tinker
Court announced the following analytical standard: content-based re-
strictions on student expression will be upheld only if necessary to
serve a compelling government interest.563 But school officials are
nevertheless free to suppress speech and expressive conduct that "ma-
terially and substantially disrupt" the work and discipline of the
school.5
64
Nearly twenty years later, in Hazelwood, the Court upheld a high
school principal's decision to remove two articles from a student
newspaper, finding the principal's actions "reasonable under the cir-
cumstances as he understood them. '565 One article examined student
pregnancy; the other described the effects of divorce on students at
the school.5 66 The Court held that where a school sponsors an activity
in such a way that students and others may reasonably perceive the
activity as bearing the school's "imprimatur," the school's authority to
restrict student speech in the context of that activity is much greater
than its authority under Tinker.5 67 Under this new, more deferential
standard, school officials may exercise editorial control over the con-
tent of student newspapers and other school-sponsored expression if
they do so in a way that is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns. 5 68
How do we distinguish the separate spheres of Tinker and Hazel-
wood? By its terms, Hazelwood is confined to student expression that
arises in the context of school-sponsored activities.5 69 Tinker contin-
ues to protect individual, non-sponsored expression-including but-
tons,570 T-shirts, 7' underground newspapers, 2 and websites created
561. See id.
562. Id. at 505-06.
563. See id. at 509-11.
564. Id. at 511.
565. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276.
566. Id. at 263.
567. Id. at 270-71.
568. Id. at 272-73.
569. Id. at 273.
570. See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 550 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying
Tinker and upholding the First Amendment right of students to wear buttons bearing the word
"scab" to protest the presence of replacement teachers during a strike).
[Vol. 29
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off campus.573 A more pressing question is whether Hazelwood will
swallow Tinker. Judges inclined to ignore Tinker have seized upon
language in Hazelwood that "[a] school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' ,,574 and
that school officials may act to ensure that students "are not exposed
to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity. 5 75
These concerns are far afield from Hazelwood's core rationale-that
school officials should enjoy editorial control over student expression
when the expression bears the school's "imprimatur." '576 In other
words, it is because such expression bears the school's stamp of ap-
proval, that school officials should be freed from Tinker and afforded
greater power to regulate it.577 By shifting the focus away from "im-
primatur, ' 578 and by stressing that school officials "need not tolerate"
student speech that is "inconsistent with [their] educational mis-
sion, ' ' 7  that dicta in Hazelwood has given the opinion far broader
impact than that warranted by its facts and rationale.
In the name of Hazelwood, subsequent decisions have upheld the
suppression of student speech that bore no trace of school sponsorship
or support.58° In these cases, restrictions on individual expression-
supposedly the province of Tinker-were analyzed not under Tinker's
"substantial disruption" test, but instead by vague reference to pro-
moting "civility [as] a legitimate pedagogical concern."58' Thus, by
571. See, e.g., Broussard v. Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526,1537 (E.D. Va. 1992) (applying Tinker
and upholding the power of school officials to ban a "Drugs Suck!" T-shirt).
572. See, e.g., Boucher v. School Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th
Cir. 1998) (applying Tinker and upholding the punishment of a student who published, in an
underground newspaper, an article on how to "hack" the school's computers).
573. See e.g. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 n.4 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (confirming that Tinker, not Hazelwood, governs this situation and granting a preliminary
injunction restraining school officials from punishing high school student whose personal In-
ternet homepage featured derogatory comments about the school, its principal, and its teachers).
574. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
575. Id. at 271.
576. Id.
577. See id. at 270-71 (recognizing that certain school-sponsored activities "may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional class-
room setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particu-
lar knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences").
578. Id. at 271.
579. Id. at 266.
580. See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F. 2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (involving the "admittedly
'discourteous' and 'rude' remarks" made by a student about his principal during a school
assembly).
581. Id. at 758 (holding that "[c]ivility is a legitimate pedagogical concern" and upholding the
punishment of a student who made "discourteous" remarks about an assistant principal while
campaigning for student office). The Poling court was confronted with quintessentially individ-
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pursuing an expansive conception of "school sponsorship, '58 2 and by
treating the promotion of "civility" as a "legitimate pedagogical con-
cern,"583 some courts are broadening Hazelwood at Tinker's expense.
When Tinker does apply, some courts are diluting its protection by
formulating a relaxed variation of Tinker's "substantial disruption"
standard. 584  And other courts have altogether abandoned Tinker's
"substantial disruption" test when confronted with student speech
that is assertedly "vulgar. '585
b. Prisons
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,586 the Supreme
Court upheld direct restrictions on efforts by prison inmates to form
and operate a union587-including a ban on soliciting other inmates to
join the union, meetings among union members, and "bulk mailings
concerning the union from outside sources. "588 Delivering the opin-
ion of the Court, Justice Rehnquist established an extremely deferen-
tial standard for gauging restrictions on inmate speech.589
ual expression-a student's own campaign speech-that would seem to be governed by Tinker.
Id. at 759. But the court ignored Tinker and applied Hazelwood instead because the speech took
place at an election assembly, and was therefore, part of a "school-sponsored" activity. Id. at
758.
582. Id. at 762.
583. Id. at 758.
584. See Broussard v. Norfolk, 801 F. Supp. 1526,1537 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that Tinker's
substantial disruption test is satisfied if school officials can demonstrate even "a reasonable fore-
cast of disruption," thus vesting authority in school officials to ban a "Drugs Suck" T-shirt);
Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (striking down
an anti-gang apparel policy banning clothing with pictures or any other insignia identifying pro-
fessional or collegiate sports teams, but noting that "the First Amendment does not require
school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act to curtail [student
expression]"). The court recognized that the speech rights of students may be abridged if facts
exist "which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities." Id. Further, the court found the threshold of po-
tential "disturbance required to justify intervention" to be relatively low in the school context.
Id. As such, the trend among some courts may evidence the erosion of Tinker's requirement
that student speech be afforded protection unless it "materially and substantially interferes]
with" the work and discipline of a school. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969).
585. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Mass. 1994) (upholding a
school's ban on T-shirts bearing a "sexual double entendre," even where there was no immediate
prospect of disruption). The "vulgar" shirts at issue contained the following messages: (1) "See
Dick Drink. See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't be a Dick," and (2) "Coed Naked Band: Do
it to the Rhythm." Id. at 158.
586. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
587. Id. at 121.
588. Id. at 121-22.
589. See id. at 128.
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Recognizing "the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions
of prison administrators,"59 Justice Rehnquist asserted that "'in the
absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the offi-
cials have exaggerated their response to [security] considerations,
courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such mat-
ters." 59 In dissent, Justice Marshall contended that the Court was
effectively applying a test that only inquired whether prison officials
had exercised their judgment in a rational manner.592 In no other con-
text, Justice Marshall asserted, is the Court this deferential.5 93
Ten years later, in Turner v. Safley,594 the Court upheld broad
restrictions on inmate-to-inmate correspondence 595-and in the pro-
cess, reaffirmed its commitment to a deferential standard in prisoner
speech cases.5 96 Announcing a test that prevails to this day,5 97 Justice
O'Connor held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests., 598 She identified four factors to
consider when applying this standard: (1) whether there exists a
"valid, rational connection" between the regulation and the govern-
mental interest put forward to justify it, (2) whether inmates are left
with "alternative means of exercising the right" that the regulation
restricts, (3) whether accommodating the asserted right would have a
significant "ripple effect" on fellow inmates or prison staff," and (4)
whether there is a ready alternative to the regulation that fully accom-
modates the asserted right "at a de minimis cost to valid penological
interests. ' 599
c. The Military
Recognizing profoundly limited speech protections within the
context of military service, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy 600
upheld the court martial of an army captain who urged black enlisted
590. Id. at 126.
591. Id. at 128 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
592. See id. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
593. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
594. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
595. Id. at 91 (finding the regulations "reasonably related to legitimate security interests").
596. See id. at 91-92.
597. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989) (confirming that "the proper in-
quiry [in prisoner speech cases] is whether the regulations are 'reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests"') (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987)).
598. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
599. Id. at 89-91.
600. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
20001
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men to refuse to fight in Vietnam.6° 1 Since "'[a]n army is not a delib-
erative body,' ,,602 and since obedience to lawful command is essential
to the effective functioning of military units,60 3 the type of disobedi-
ence urged by the defendant finds no First Amendment protection.60 4
Citing a commander's need to maintain morale, discipline, and
readiness, the Court in Brown v. Glines605 went far beyond Parker,
upholding a regulation that required service members to obtain ad-
vance permission from their commander before circulating any peti-
tion on an Air Force base. 6 In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted:
"[This] Court abdicates its responsibility to safeguard free expression
when it reflexively bows before the shibboleth of military
necessity. "607
4. Speech Rights of Public Employees
The Supreme Court has created special rules governing the
speech rights of public employees. 60 8 These rules essentially balance a
government employer's interest in promoting workplace efficiency
against the employee's interest in commenting freely on matters of
public concern.60 9 When an employee criticizes a government em-
601. Id. at 356.
602. Id. at 743-44 (quoting In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890)).
603. See id. at 758.
604. See id. at 757.
605. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
606. Id. at 356.
607. Id. at 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
608. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-76 (1996) (summarizing
the Court's rules concerning public employee speech in stating that "government workers are
constitutionally protected from dismissal for refusing to take an oath regarding their political
affiliation, for publicly or privately criticizing their employer's policies, for expressing hostility to
prominent political figures, or, except where political affiliation may reasonably be considered
an appropriate job qualification, for supporting or affiliating with a particular political party");
see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment:
The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529 (1998) (summarizing
and critiquing existing public employee doctrine).
609. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (finding that "[t]o be protected, the
[employee's] speech must be on a matter of public concern" and the "employee's interest in
expressing herself.., must not be outweighed by an injury the speech could cause to 'the inter-
est of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees"') (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)); Picker-
ing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing that "[t]he problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
ciency of the public services it performs through its employees"). The Pickering balancing test
has also been applied to the First Amendment rights of independent contractors. See Umbehr,
518 U.S. at 678-85 (discussing application of the Court's public employee doctrine to indepen-
dent contractors and finding "no reason to believe that proper application of the Pickering bal-
[Vol. 29
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ployer, the difficulty is to determine whether the employee's words
are protected political speech or an unprotected act of
insubordination.
This dichotomy is exemplified in two Supreme Court cases: Pick-
ering v. Board of Education61 ° and Connick v. Myers.6 1' In Pickering,
a public schoolteacher was terminated for publishing a letter in a local
newspaper criticizing the school board's spending of tax revenues and
questioning its purported need for new revenues.612 In Connick, an
assistant district attorney was fired for circulating a workplace ques-
tionnaire inquiring whether her colleagues "felt pressured to work in
political campaigns" in order to keep their jobs.6 13 The Court sided
with the terminated schoolteacher in Pickering, holding that school
tax levies are matters of legitimate public concern and teacher's
should "be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of
retaliatory dismissal. ' 6 14 But in Connick, the Court sided with the
employer, who described the questionnaire as an act of insubordina-
tion that prompted a "mini-insurrection" in the workplace. '615 The
Court concluded that the questionnaire "touched upon matters of
public concern in only the most limited sense," and was therefore wor-
thy of only minimal First Amendment protection.616 Thus, the bal-
ance of interests favored the employer, who was not required to
"tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the of-
fice, undermine his authority, and destroy close working
relationships."617
Connick indicates that speech by a public employee will be af-
forded ever greater weight in this balancing analysis the more it as-
cends from a personal workplace grievance to pure political
expression.618 Thus, in Rankin v. McPherson,61 9 the Court sided with
a clerical worker in a county constable's office who was discharged for
expressing her contempt for the policies of President Reagan.620 Ap-
ancing test cannot accommodate the differences between employees and independent
contractors").
610. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
611. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
612. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
613. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
614. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.
615. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52.
616. Id. at 154.
617. Id.
618. See Rosenthal, supra note 618, at 539-41.
619. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
620. Id. at 379-81.
2000]
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prised of the assassination attempt on Reagan, the employee cited his
cutbacks on welfare, food stamps, and medicaid, and declared: [I]f
they go for him again, I hope they get him."'621 This statement, held
the Court, was plainly a form of political expression, since it was ut-
tered in the context of a conversation criticizing Reagan's policies.622
And the "inappropriate or controversial character" of the statement
was "irrelevant" to whether it dealt with a matter of public concern.623
Applying its balancing test, the Court concluded that the speech rights
of the employee trumped the employer's interests because there was
no proof that her statement, uttered in a private conversation, either
discredited the constable's office or interfered with its efficient
operation.624
In related lines of precedent, the Court has held that government
workers are constitutionally protected from dismissal for refusing to
take an oath regarding their political affiliation.6 25 Likewise, except
where relevant to job performance, it is unconstitutional to discharge
a government worker 626 or deny her a promotion627 based on her affil-
iation with a particular political party.
621. Id. at 381.
622. See id. at 386 (holding that "[clonsidering the statement in context, as Connick requires,
discloses that it plainly dealt with a matter of public concern").
623. Id. at 387.
624. See id. at 388-89 (finding that "[niot only was [the employee's] discharge unrelated to
the functioning of the office, it was not based on any assessment by the [employer] that the
remark demonstrated a character trait that made [the employee] unfit to perform her work").
625. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967) (declaring invalid two
laws applied to university faculty "insofar as they proscribe mere knowing membership without
any showing of specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the Communist Party"); Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966) (invalidating the oath of office for Arizona state employees
because "[a]ny law which applies to membership without the 'specified intent' to further the
illegal aims of the organization infringes uneccessarily on protected freedoms"); Wieman v. Up-
degraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (invalidating the oath of office for Oklahoma state employees
because "[i]t is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory").
626. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 520 (1980) (enjoining a government employee's ter-
mination on purely political grounds); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (enjoining a
government employee's termination on the sole basis of the employee's affiliation with the Dem-
ocratic Party). These protections against patronage discharge were later extended to indepen-
dent contractors. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1996)
(finding that, "[a]lthough the government has broad discretion in formulating its contracting
policies,... the protections of Elrod and Branti extend to... where the government retaliates
against a contractor, or a regular provider of services, for the exercise of rights of political associ-
ation or expression of political allegiance").
627. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (finding that "the rule
of Elrod and Branti extends to promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions based on party
affiliation and support").
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5. Government-Funded Expression
In this special context-where the government is funding expres-
sive activity, the Court's review is utterly deferential, upholding even
viewpoint discrimination.
In Rust v. Sullivan,62 8 the Court held that Congress did not of-
fend the First Amendment by conditioning federal public health fund-
ing upon the recipient's abstaining from providing counseling about
abortion or advocating abortion as a method of family planning.629
Rust's upshot was to broaden the government's power to exert control
over the speech of government grantees-permitting even viewpoint
discrimination in doling out government subsidies.63 °
More recently, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,63 1
the Court upheld a federal statute employing viewpoint discrimination
in public arts funding.632 The Court found that, "as a practical matter,
* . . artists may conform their speech to what they believe to be the
decision making criteria in order to acquire funding. '633 The Court
reasoned that "there is a basic difference between direct state interfer-
ence with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alterna-
tive activity conosant with legislative policy." '63 4 In dissent, Justice
Souter cited the statute's "decency and respect" proviso, which "pe-
nalizes [art] that disrespects the ideology, opinions, or convictions of a
significant segment of the American [public, but not] art that rein-
forces those values, '635 as a patent example of "viewpoint discrimina-
tion, '"636 and he expressed bafflement why the statute should not be
struck down under the Court's well-established hostility to viewpoint-
based restrictions.637
628. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
629. Id. at 203.
630. Id. at 193 (finding that "[tihe Government can, without violating the Constitution, selec-
tively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in
another way"). But the Court did not consider the funding denial to abortion-related activities
as viewpoint discrimination. See id. Rather, the Court found that Congress "has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other." Id.
631. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
632. Id. at 589.
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting).
636. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
637. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)).
2000]
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IV. CONCLUSION
In elaborating its Speech Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has developed a dense mass of overlapping doctrines-from
overbreadth, 638 vagueness, 639 and prior restraint 64° to the "hostile au-
dience" cases64' and the public forum doctrine." 2 This Article sorts,
identifies, and explains the myriad lines of Speech Clause precedent,
while furnishing a framework for analyzing any government restric-
tion on speech. That analytical framework is comprised of five ques-
tions that are designed to serve as an issue-spotting checklist. It is the
author's hope that this framework will alleviate the confusion that so
frequently attends the litigation of First Amendment claims-helping
to identify, and to distinguish clearly among, the many strands of pre-
cedent that may govern a given case.
638. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569,
577 (1987) (striking down, on overbreadth grounds, a regulation prohibiting any person from
engaging "in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport").
639. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 582 (1974) (striking down, on vagueness
grounds, a Massachusetts statute criminalizing publicly treating the American flag "contemp-
tuously").
640. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (striking down, as
prior restraints, certain injunctions barring the New York Times and Washington Post from pub-
lishing excerpts from the "Pentagon Papers," a top-secret Defense Department study of the
Vietnam War).
641. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112-13 (1969) (overturning the disor-
derly conduct convictions of 85 civil rights protesters whose peaceful march produced a hostile
reaction by approximately 1000 onlookers).
642. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992) (elaborating the public forum doctrine and examining the distinctions between traditional
public fora, designated public fora, and nonpublic fora).
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